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Recently I joined the table for an extended family dinner.  Talking as we ate, the family 
began by addressing safe, neutral topics like cooking, gardening, and the weather.  Inevitably, as 
the night progressed and the food diminished, the conversation turned to politics.  Our discussion 
narrowed on national security when my cousin suggested that airport profiling and attacks on 
Middle Eastern communities could serve a beneficial purpose for Americans.  Although I do not 
shy away from contention, I felt taken aback by this statement.  Choosing my words carefully, I 
asked him why Middle Eastern people in particular deserved to be singled out.   Very plainly, he 
answered:  “There's just a culture of evil over there”.
This sound byte, recycled from American political discourse (Bush 2002, Reagan 1983), 
challenged the basic tenet with which modern anthropologists approach their discipline:  We are 
trained to believe that culture is neither good nor evil.  It is more palatable to think of political 
and socioeconomic systems that subjugate or disenfranchise their citizens as morally suspect.  To 
argue that one has “good” culture while others have “evil” actively places culture in a vacuum 
and reflects a deeply ingrained ethnocentrism.  But why does so much of the media rhetoric seek 
to  classify  it  as  such?   My cousin's  offhand  comment  spoke  to  a  far  more  serious  reality. 
America  and  Europe  have  a  history  of  condemning  enemy  nations  as  evil  or  barbarous. 
Recently,  this rhetoric has manifested in Western condemnations of enemies as human rights 
abusers.  Due in part to this display of cultural politics, many communities in North America and 
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Europe believe that their Western culture embraces freedom and human rights while Arab and 
Muslim cultures disregard these values.  But what gives the West such moral superiority?  Can 
cultural practices be misunderstood as human rights issues?  Conversely, when do Authoritarian 
states incorrectly cite cultural  difference as a shield to protect themselves from human rights 
advocates?
Cultural Politics, Universalism, and Cultural Relativism
Entrenched in clear philosophical camps, both Islamists and Western leaders engage in 
cultural politics.  I use that phrase here to refer to a politicized discourse in which culture is 
stereotyped, exoticized, and appropriated on the global stage.  Cultural politics reduces Western 
and Eastern bodies of thought to a few, simple talking points that stand in opposition to 'the 
enemy'.  Certain practices are lauded while others are ignored, based on their geopolitical use. 
The veil, for example, became enormously important when the French and Turkish governments 
tried  to  ban  it  in  public  spaces.   Thus  a  symbol  of  modesty  transformed  into  a  symbol  of 
assertion and liberation.  At the same time, the veil became a symbol of disenfranchisement and 
patriarchy to some within Western feminism, for whom it represented everything that modern, 
enlightenment-influenced  women  must  cast  aside.   Leaders  from George  Bush (CNN News 
2001) to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (CNN News 2008) use culture as both weapon and shield, 
attacking the other's corrupt values while ignoring criticism as cultural miscommunication.  
Human  rights  discourse  is  hotly  contested  in  law,  international  relations,  and 
anthropology circles.  During the post-colonial  nationalist  resurgence in the Middle East and 
North Africa, communities in the region rejected human rights because of their Western origins 
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(Chase  2006,  Dalacoura  1998,  Kepel  2002,  Mayer  1998).   This  framework  continues  to 
undermine  the  efforts  of  human rights  workers and both Western  and Arab activists  have a 
responsibility  for  separating  human  rights  discourse  and  postcolonial  interference.   While 
traditional human rights schemes may seek to impose values on other societies, the capabilities 
approach forwarded by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum provides a solid philosophical base 
for  cross  cultural  dialog.   Although many models  examine  human  rights  violations  through 
statistics, the capabilities approach considers them within local, enculturated standards.  In this 
thesis, I argue that this human rights framework is unique in its potential to guide the respectful 
navigation of cultural politics and international dialogue around global inequity and injustice.
Any  cross  cultural  analysis  of  human  rights  necessitates  a  firm  understanding  of 
universalism  and  cultural  relativism.   While  human  rights  have  existed  conceptually  for 
centuries,  the  first  attempt  toward  global  codification  was  drafted  in  1948.   Still  the  most 
powerful document of its kind, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) continues to 
serve as the basis for international human rights laws, conventions, and agreements.  The UDHR 
should be commended as a positive step forward in international relations history, but it cannot 
and should not remain the final say on universal human rights.  Drafted primarily by men from 
former  colonial  powers  and  entrenched  in  Western  Enlightenment  philosophy,  the  UDHR 
espouses  individual  civil  and  political  rights  familiar  to  European  and  North  American 
constitutions.  While I do not seek to belittle the importance of first-generation rights, which 
serve as important checks to the potential power of any governing body, critics (Galtung 1995, 
Monshipouri 1998) note that UDHR is conspicuously less clear on social, economic, and cultural 
rights.  Where are the rights to peace, development, environmental heritage, or cultural tradition? 
Article twenty-seven acknowledges the right to participation of the individual, but the UDHR 
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does not address communal rights to customs such as circumcision or veiling.  Furthermore, the 
philosophy  supporting  universal  rights  derived  from  reason  and  'natural  law'  is  necessarily 
ethnocentric as it depends on European enlightenment theory and the belief in universal truths 
(Dembour 2001, Maduagwu 1987, Renteln 1990).  
In  practice,  universalism entails  presumptions  of  power  hierarchy.   Whose  rights  are 
deemed universal and whose power structures are entitled to determine this?  As the Soviet Bloc 
noted  with  its  initial  abstention  during  UDHR  ratification,  the  rights  under  the  Universal 
Declaration take shape within a capitalist  context in which the autonomous, property holding 
individual is the default human being.  Because they depend on laws judges, and reparations, 
they  can  only  exist  in  societies  with  infrastructures  designed  around  large-scale  judiciaries, 
executives, and market-based economies.  Universal rights are designed to remedy problems that 
only exist  in  large scale  society:   prisons,  torture,  and government  imposition.   The UDHR 
recognizes the rights to food, health care, property, and higher education, but one must still go 
forth to earn them.  Drawing on the idea that policy reflects distributions of power, some critics 
go so far as to claim that human rights and capitalism are inexorably intertwined, that “because 
of the social divisions that make rights both possible and necessary, the net effect of the arrival 
and enforcement of rights discourse is more likely to be endless strife than perpetual peace” 
(Woodiwiss  2005:   137).   Woodiwiss  continues,  arguing  that  human  rights  are  based  in 
systematic  inequalities  of  hierarchical  society  (social,  economic,  political,  cultural)  and  thus 
require citizens to sacrifice their desire to change the system while they treat symptoms but offer 
no cures to these inequalities.  An examination of the rights in the UDHR reveals the assumption 
that the state will abuse its power to politically disenfranchise its citizens.  While it offers a series 
of protections against such abuses, the Universal Declaration offers no solutions to the political, 
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societal,  economic, and cultural forces that reinforce such a power structure.  Universalism is 
meaningful because of the prevalence of authoritarian abuses to civil and political rights and its 
pragmatism  allows  for  clear  action  regarding  human  rights  abuses.   When  approached 
appropriately,  universalism can be a  valuable  tool  but  its  philosophical  rigidity  makes  it  ill-
adapted  to  pluralistic  global  society  in  its  most  extreme  form.   Inevitably,  such  extreme 
universalism leads to an equally strong and equally misguided extreme cultural relativism.
As synthesized from the ethical relativist philosophies of: Friedrich Engels, who argued 
that ethics were a product of economic situations; Max Weber, who argued that any evaluative 
statements  are  reflections  of  world  views;  and  Melville  Hershkovits,  who  questioned  the 
reflection  of  European and American  norms  in  the Universal  declaration  (Maduagwu 1987), 
extreme cultural relativism argues that no observer can pass judgment on a society.  This notion, 
advanced by Boasian anthropologists to promote tolerance, challenges not only human rights law 
but all international laws.  If we deny the existence of any universal rights, international law can 
only perpetuate the moral imperialism of the law writers.  Relativism is absolutely necessary for 
any  rights  discourse  because  only  a  relativist  perspective  has  the  potential  to  challenge  a 
presumed universality of standards that are actually culturally based (Renteln 1990).  This deeper 
understanding is an invaluable tool for cross-cultural dialog.  This is not to say that human rights 
standards apply to only one society but rather that relativism gives advocates and anthropologists 
an accurate perspective on ideas of universality, truth, and justice.  Such humility and openness 
to new ideas are crucial for international dialog.  In criticizing universal standards, relativists 
point to the inapplicability of Western standards and caution against the presumption of rights 
workers who impose those standards on the people they wish to help.
Paradoxically the relativist counter-argument to universalism, designed to protect cultural 
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heritage  from  outside  interference,  performs  a  great  disservice  by  homogenizing  regional 
cultures, excessively separating other communities, and downplaying the importance of human 
rights in cultural politics.  Pragmatically, extreme relativism cannot survive in an increasingly 
globalized world.  People are interacting transnationally at incredible rates, bringing historically 
isolated  cultures  into  direct  contact.   This  global  scope  introduces  a  host  of  new  social, 
economic, and political factors into cross-cultural examinations.  Relativists who claim that no 
Western standards apply to a particular  community assume that members of that  community 
unanimously agree to reject them.  Critics (Dembour 2001, Maduagwu 1987, Mayer 1998) argue 
that values differ among colleagues and even family members, so I agree with their sentiment 
that  no  single  cultural  entity  exerts  homogeneity.   Anthropology  is,  in  part,  the  science  of 
understanding cultural patterns, and so we must be especially careful that our observations do not 
become simple ‘othering’.  Cultural trends might seem to define a society but they could never 
hope to express the complicated views of a person.
By  focusing  on  differences  between  cultures  to  the  exclusion  of  their  similarities, 
relativist discourse is counterproductive and divisive.  Edward Said criticized this constructed 
othering because it establishes that "on the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there 
are  Arab-Orientals;  the former are  (in no particular  order)  rational,  peaceful,  liberal,  logical, 
capable of holding real values, without natural suspicion; the latter  are none of these things" 
(Said 1994).  In perpetuating historical differences, extreme relativism unintentionally exoticizes 
the people it aims to protect.
I  argue that  discarding universal  human rights  in  favor of relativism is  unacceptable; 
genocide,  torture,  racism, sexism, and inequality exist  and anthropologists  should not remain 
indifferent to them.  However, universalism remains unabashedly Western.  The historical and 
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ongoing subjugation of poor or geopolitically excluded communities in the global South and East 
by corporate,  geopolitical  leaders  in  the West  without  regard to  cultural  heritage  undermine 
human rights legitimacy. But if neither universalism nor relativism can appropriately address the 
human rights issues in the modern world,  what can?  As many authors (Cowan et  al.  2001, 
Santos  2002,  Caney  2001,  Renteln  1990,  Dembour  2001)  note,  the  relativism-universalism 
debate tends to frame human rights as falling into one catagory at the expensive of the other. 
Fortunately, such dichotomies exist only in social theory.  A practical approach to human rights 
combines elements of both, producing what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002) called diatopical 
hermeneutics.   Alternately  called  cross-cultural  dialog  (Renteln  1990),  this  approach  is 
advocated by Western and Middle Eastern scholars including Abdullah an-Na'im (2008) and 
Emile  Saliyeh  (2003).   Once  the  global  community  accepts  the  necessity  of  human  rights 
discourse despite its Western origins, previously marginalized voices can add their own input 
and  form  pluralistic  and  respectful  international  standards.   By  tempering  universal  rights 
discourse with the cross-cultural understanding, human rights dialog can be both effective and 
applicable.
Islamism and Contested History
In speaking generally about human rights issues in the Middle East, North Africa, and an 
Islamic context, I should clarify my intent.  As an outsider, I do not wish to pass judgment on 
another  society  but  rather  to  offer  my  observations  and  analysis.   Additionally,  Islamic 
homogeneity  is  as  much  a  false  construction  as  Western  homogeneity;  I  can  only speak  to 
general trends while appreciating the great diversity of thought and practice within the Middle 
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East and North Africa.  For every Western critic of Middle Eastern veiling, a Middle Eastern 
critic  can  respond  with  similar  comments  regarding  Western  materialism  or  demeaning 
pornography.  Respectful criticism on either side does not negate the other's validity.  Indeed the 
greatest  value of cross-cultural  dialog is the potential  to learn and grow through this kind of 
discussion.  The conflict emerges when political figures use culture to attack their enemies.  I do 
not intend to deny the effect  of religious fervor in the region as a motivator for violence or 
human rights violations.  Rather, I would argue that the political, social, and economic climate 
provided its support to a narrow and extremist version of religion that offers salvation through 
obedience  to  the  state  and  violence  against  the  historical  oppressors.   By  restricting  and 
discouraging  change,  such  religious  philosophy  limits  the  capabilities  of  individuals  and 
communities to fulfill their potential.
Our current conception of civilizational conflict  between Islamic cultural  tradition and 
Western values of life, equality, and personal freedom exists because of inflammatory remarks 
from prominent, popular voices on both sides.  The New York Times noted the growing distrust 
among  European  officials,  including  Pope  Benedict  XVI,  placing  Islam  at  odds  with  the 
treasured  Western  right  to  free  speech  (Bilefsky  and Fisher  2006).   Former  president  Bush 
commented about crusades (Myers 2008) and axes of evil, and one need only watch the FOX 
news network to see pundits and statesmen criticize region, religion, and culture.  On the other 
side, Iranian leaders have leveled a number of charges on America, most notably Khomeini's 
infamous Great Satan remark.  Ranking Taliban and al-Qaeda members continue to incite acts of 
violence and leaders like Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri call for militant attacks 
(Aljazeera 2008).  Meanwhile various radical  groups have implemented terrorist acts in New 
York City, London, Madrid, Bali, and throughout the Arab world.  Regardless of the origin of 
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this tension, East and West both perpetuate inflammatory statements and action.  There is fault 
on both sides.  This is the climate in which Americans, Europeans, North Africans, and Middle-
Eastern people view one another.  In such an environment culture assumes an easy target:  the 
other becomes symbolically vilified through their traditions.  But such hierarchical ranking and 
cultural assertion only distracts from the real factors driving this perceived 'culture clash'.  To 
properly implement  cross-cultural  dialog between human rights  workers and the people they 
wish to help, we must first understand the political, social, and economic forces that have formed 
the current distrust and perceived disregard for human rights.
Undeniably, the most dramatic force shaping the “myth of confrontation” (Halliday 1996) 
is Western colonialism.  Since the crusades, the Western world has been both fascinated and 
frustrated with the Middle East,  leading to the phenomenon Edward Said coined orientalism. 
Conceptualizing the Middle East as a strange world complete with a culture resistant to Christian 
missionaries allowed European colonial powers to dominate while reducing the population to a 
bizarre 'other' composed of regional and recycled anti-Semitic stereotypes (Said 1994).  Owing 
to its  geographical  proximity,  the Ottoman Empire provided an unwelcome and omnipresent 
reminder of this  other world during Europe's colonial  period.   Despite European attacks,  the 
empire maintained its sovereignty until the early twentieth century.
Memory  of  this  resilience  and  of  Christian  defeat  during  the  crusades  added  the 
geopolitical fuel to orientalism.  By the time of the Ottoman Empire's collapse following the 
First World War, European powers had established themselves throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa (Halliday 1996).  When colonial powers appeared, they attempted to impose their 
own  social,  economic,  and  political  systems.   As  they  artificially  created  new  national 
boundaries,  nation-states  appeared  haphazardly  in  the  midst  of  clan  boundaries  and  defunct 
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Ottoman provinces, complete with newly developed capitalist market economies that exploited 
the  trade  networks  (Tibi  1998).   Frustration  with  foreign  domination  festered  as  European 
powers,  namely  France  and Britain,  consolidated  their  power.   They appropriated  trade  and 
transportation lines for their geopolitical strategy and kept the people in check through a series of 
corrupt regional leaders.  Then, with the conclusion of the Second World War, the European 
colonial  period in the Middle East swiftly declined.   Leaving behind only the newly created 
Israel  and a legacy of authoritarian rule and socioeconomic subjugation,  Europe relinquished 
official control of the region.  
As a result of ethnocentric colonial empires, the West had come to represent exploitation, 
aggression, and imposition and colonialism provided the necessary catalyst for modern political 
Islam, or Islamism.  Part national, religious, and philosophical assertion, Islamism evolved from 
a  rejection  of  foreign  authoritarian  rule  and  exploitation,  finally  gaining  power  in  the 
postcolonial  age  (Chase  2006,  Dalacoura  1998,  Kepel  2002,  Mayer  1998).   Often,  outside 
observers confuse Islam with Islamism.  Islam is a religion, a set of moral principles, codified 
values, and written traditions.  Speaking generally, Muslims draw upon a number of sources for 
religious guidance, namely the Qu'ran, the holy revelations of Allah to Mohammed, the Hadith, 
the oral traditions of the prophet, and Shari'a, the collected body of Islamic jurisprudence.  Of 
these, only the Qu'ran is divine while the Hadith and Shari'a derive from human interpretation 
(An-Na'im 1996, An-Na'im 2008).  Islamism gains its legitimacy from a selectively conservative 
Qu'ranic reading and an authoritarian and patriarchal interpretation of the Hadith and Shari'a. 
During the  power struggles  following the prophet  Mohammed's  death,  various  religious  and 
political leaders selectively chose certain texts to fit their strategic needs while opposition was 
deemed heretical  and anti-Islamic (Moussalli  2001, al-'Ashmawy,  1998).  To legitimize their 
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power, political rulers emphasized verses justifying, among other ideas, disenfranchisement and 
female subordinancy while suppressing others.   By enforcing their  own narrow views at  the 
exclusion of liberal or moderate scholars, these early men were able to channel Islamic thought 
and political process toward absolutist rule.  This historical precedent still haunts Islamist policy 
by discrediting the legitimacy of reformers as Western agents. 
Such interpretations, combined with military conflict during the crusades "would finally 
give the upper hand to authoritarianism and traditionalism and reduce the margins of free public 
space and weaken the original powers of society"  (Moussalli 2001:49).  Reacting to political 
stress,  an  elite  group  presented  their  conservative  interpretation  as  truth.   Centuries  later, 
Islamists drew on this construction as historical fact and recycled it as the basis for their own 
authoritarian rule.  By presenting extremism as the patriotic alternative to Western colonial rule, 
Islamists gained popular support.  They worked within the existing confines of the nation-states 
and  capitalism,  funding  support  for  their  view  of  religious  polity.   They  gained  additional 
popular support from the rampant corruption, repression, and overall economic failure of secular 
states like Morocco, Iran, and Egypt (Kepel 2002, Monshipouri 1998, Waltz and Benstead 2006, 
Dwyer, 1991).
Radical groups and thinkers throughout the Middle East and North Africa rose to power, 
including the Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabism, Sayyid Qutb, Ruhollah Khomeini, and Sayyid 
Abdul  Ala  Maududi.   Qutb,  Khomeini,  and Maududi  are  especially  important  because  their 
scholarly  critiques  of  Western  materialism,  morality,  and  preoccupation  with  money,  their 
commentary  on  key  scripture  and  Islamic  history,  and  their  political  efforts  to  organize  a 
religious  and  ostensibly  moral  state  laid  the  philosophical  foundation  for  modern  Islamism. 
Their philosophy was radical and political, as it needed to be to compete with similarly radical 
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and vocal calls  for Zionism and Pan-Arabism among nationalists of every variety during the 
turbulent 1960s.  Because Qutb was so much more concerned with broad philosophical ideas 
than tangible battles or physical wars, he probably would have had reservations about the means 
and  targets  used  by  Al-Qaeda.   Nonetheless,  the  terrorist  group  identifies  Qutb  as  a  key 
theoretician in their work (Berman 2003).  Their influence legitimized an extremist  religious 
interpretation that  marginalized other  perspectives  and formed an important  alliance between 
clerics, politicians, and militants.  I deny the validity of the positive connotations of the term 
fundamentalism  because  it  implies  that  this  restrictive  interpretation  accurately  reflects  the 
fundamental precepts of Islam.  Instead, I agree with Sa'id al-Ashamawy (1998) and favor the 
term extremist, which more accurately describes Islamist philosophy.
This alliance came to dominate the postcolonial region when radical Islamism, funded by 
Saudi  oil  and  legitimized  by Khomeini's  revolution,  spread  throughout  the  Middle  East  and 
North Africa to call for religious states  (Kepel 2002, Dorraj 1999).  This previously marginal 
and radical movement now had the impetus to shape postcolonial resentment to their political 
gain.  As part of their political and social domination, the British and French discouraged any 
dissent including that based in freedom of religion or ideas and that appealed to human rights 
sentiment  (Saliyeh  2003).   In denying  these freedoms,  the colonial  powers created  the ideal 
environment  for  extremists  and  inspired  an  underground  backlash  that  fused  religious  and 
nationalist fervor.  When the region finally gained independence, the movement fragmentalized 
as  nationalists  succumbed to  corruption and religious  leaders  radicalized.   Islamism asserted 
itself as a new religious national identity that would remain true to regional development and 
'traditional'  Arab-Islamic values.   Frustrated by the lack of socioeconomic development and 
their  corrupt  and  repressive  regimes,  "social  and  political  discontent  was  most  commonly 
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expressed in the cultural sphere, through a rejection of the nationalist ideologies of the ruling 
cliques in favor of Islamist ideology" (Kepel 2002:66).  Kepel uses culture here to refer to the 
resurgence  of  identity  as  an  Arab  Muslim rather  than  a  citizen  of  an  artificial  state,  not  in 
reference  to  specific  cultural  heritage.   Transcending  the  boundaries  of  national  assertion 
associated with Islamism, culture deals with clothing, sexuality, and world views, not political 
goals.  
In fact,  cultural  practices have relatively little to do with Islamism.  The movement’s 
success is largely a product of Western subjugation:  the presumed cultural confrontation can be 
much better described as a geopolitical backlash.  Kepel notes that the strict interpretation nearly 
caused the Islamist movement to collapse by the turn of the century as rival factions fragmented 
and fought against each other in the name of the 'true' way.  Unfortunately, the aftermath of the 
September eleventh attacks, a "desperate symbol of the isolation, fragmentation, and decline of 
the  Islamist  movement"  (Kepel  2002:375),  gave  extremists  the  political  fuel  necessary  to 
revitalize  the  movement.   The  era  of  globalization  has  introduced  foreign  economic,  social, 
political, and cultural elements.  By using culture to define themselves in contrast to the global 
community, Islamists hope to deny the advancement of globalization.  However, this dichotomy 
is false:  globalization itself brings as much Eastern culture to the West as vice versa.  When 
Western  nations  and  corporations  attempt  to  control  the  local  economies  globalization  is 
interpreted, often correctly, as neoimperialism, to the point where some Muslims "feel they are 
under siege by the West" (Monshipouri 1998:52).  This economic subjugation recalls the former 
colonial domination and lends support to extremists who offer an internal, Muslim alternative.
Current Islamist thought, rhetoric, and action bears only a passing resemblance to cultural 
practices  like  gender,  dress,  or  world  interpretation.   Instead,  it  deals  with  the  effort  to 
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consolidate political power and resist former colonial authority.  Inter-regional differences have 
been  cast  aside  in  favor  of  a  united  front  against  the  oppressors  in  Europe  and  America. 
Anything  Western was subject  to  suspicion  strictly  because of  its  origin thanks  to a  fear  of 
neocolonialism.  This includes the Universal Declaration, drafted before the colonial collapse. 
This environment inadvertently nurtured reactionary feelings of nationalism and religious pride. 
As part of an intellectual resurgence in the absence of a physical revolution, Muslims came to 
"reject Western ideas only because the West tried to force the Muslim world to accept them. 
Western force, exploitation, the crusades, and the weakness of Muslims, all caused Muslims to 
panic and fear accepting Western ideas" (Amin in Khatab and Bouma 2007:63).  This is the 
framework within which human rights advocates now work.  
Navigating Insularity, Arrogance, and Incompatibility
Numerous critics perceive an incompatibility between Islam and human rights.  Some 
argue that Islam, Islamic law, and Arab culture are incompatible with human rights (Ali 2007, 
Pipes 2003).  Others argue that human rights have existed within the Shari'a for centuries (Dwyer 
1991, Saliyeh, 2003).  Still others contend that human rights and Islam address entirely spheres 
of influence (Chase 2006, Donnelly 2003).  One critique in cultural politics falls in line with 
Samuel  Huntington and his  ‘clash of civilizations’  theory (1996),  which posits  that  Western 
democracy and Islam are mutually inexclusive.  In rejecting the absolutism of the incompatibility 
theory, I also note that the human rights protections of Shari'a and Islamic tradition have been 
unsuccessful in nations claiming to govern under religious law.  But to argue that this reflects 
culture or even popular tradition ignores centuries of patriarchy and political domination.
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Ayaan Hirsi Ali is one particularly vocal critic.  Rather than placing current social order 
in its historical context, Ali's 2007 memoir Infidel frames it exclusively within Arab and Islamic 
culture.   Throughout  her  compelling  and  powerful  story,  Ali  documents  and  criticizes  the 
fanaticism in North African communities of her upbringing and her feeling of subordination. 
But  in  each  instance,  from  female  genital  cutting,  veiling,  Saudi  sexual  segregation,  book 
burning, or even physical violence, Ali blames culture as a driving force.  She does not address 
the  economic  necessity  of  genital  cutting  in  North  Africa  or  the  political  motivation  for 
disenfranchising  the female  population.   As I  shall  discuss  later,  class  elites  often use  such 
cultural practices to further economic and political goals.  Even as she observes the state system 
failing in Somalia, Ali credits Islam and culture with the appeal of religious fanaticism.  This 
observation assumes that opportunistic clerics and extremists  did not seek to fill  the political 
vacuum left by the colonial powers.
Although I appreciate Ali's struggle and admire her book, her analysis can be simplistic 
because it ignores the complex political, economic, and social push toward "traditional culture" 
as interpreted and defined by those in control of the postcolonial Middle East and North Africa. 
When culture appears to subjugate, this represents a greater effort to subjugate the population by 
those wielding political, social, religious, and economic power.  Culture, defined by its fluidity, 
cannot force itself upon an unwilling community—only political structures have this influence. 
This  conflation  of  culture  and state  dynamics  becomes  clear  as  Ali  describes  her asylum in 
Holland.  In contrasting her Somali  and Dutch lifestyles,  she almost exoticizes her European 
standard of living in comparison to the Arab world, ultimately concluding, "one of these worlds 
is simply better than the other.  Not because of its flashy gadgets, but fundamentally, because of 
its  values" (Ali  2007:348).   I  believe that  Ali  is  confusing Holland's  political  and economic 
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stability with its cultural heritage.  When allowed to liberalize, as Western states have, European 
Christian and Arab Muslim values are extremely similar.  Dutch culture is as equally valid and 
invalid as Somali or Saudi culture and any arguments to the contrary conflate political stability 
with cultural  merit  and resound with ethnocentrism.   Ali owes her success in Europe not to 
culture  but to state stability and support.   To argue cultural  or religious superiority supports 
ethnocentrism and thus compromises the hope for respectful cross-cultural dialog.   
Political leaders can cite a tradition of incompatibility between universal human rights 
and Islam because they have strategically controlled the law's interpretation and implementation 
(Moussalli 2001).  In modern times, Ann Mayer notes that "undemocratic regimes perceived the 
growing influence of human rights ideas as a threat, which gave them the incentive to concoct 
new sets  of  Islamic  rules  on  human  rights,  in  which  Islamic  criteria  could  be  deployed  to 
override  and  circumscribe  human  rights  and  to  maintain  old  hierarchies  and  forestall  an 
advancement of freedoms" (Mayer 2006:68-9).  By citing the Western origins of human rights, 
such regimes can justify their actions as resistance against the West.  As tangible representatives 
of a historical oppressor, human rights advocates can appear ethnocentric and recall the efforts of 
missionaries sent to save the savages.  This idea has significant merit if one notes, with Noam 
Chomsky (2003), that American foreign policy uses human rights discourse when it is politically 
and economically beneficial.   Human rights were at the forefront of the justifications for war 
with  Iraq,  and  are  completely  ignored  when  the  American  government  wishes  to  promote 
economic and geopolitical stability,  as is the case with Saudi Arabia.  Such double standards 
weaken human rights legitimacy while providing a wary population with greater evidence of a 
neo-colonial  agenda (Chomsky 1998,  Chomsky 2003,  Gerges  1999,  Halliday  1996).   These 
tactics also discredit the effort of human rights workers by presenting human rights discourse as 
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a tool for military action, political interference, and general ethnocentrism.  
Yet, following an extreme relativist logic, one could easily conclude that human rights 
are only acceptable for Western nations while the Middle East and North Africa should continue 
without them, a conclusion both orientalist (Mayer 1998) and inherently insular (al-'Ashmawy 
1998).  Beginning with politically motivated restrictions and greatly compounded by colonial 
interference, the Arab and Islamic world have engaged in cultural, social, economic, and political 
exchanges  with  the  West  that  have  fundamentally  shaped  their  development.   Despite  their 
Western origins, the region accepts the concepts of the nation-state and market economy.  More 
importantly, the Middle East and North Africa are home to a number of internal human rights 
organizations devoted to the development of a regional human rights schemes (Dwyer 1991, The 
Harvard  Law  School  Human  Rights  Program  and  the  Center  for  the  Study  of  Developing 
Countries at Cairo University 2000, Skaine 2005).  Any claim of incompatibility due to regional 
or  Islamic  exceptionalism  recalls  a  false  nostalgia  and  posits  that  culture  and  society  have 
remained unchanged and uninfluenced:  this is simply not true.  Even in its early development, 
the ideal authoritarian state governed by strict religious rule has never existed (Moussalli, 2001 
Mayer 1998).
With  this  in  mind,  I  agree  with writers  like  Abdullah  an-Na'im (2003),  Bassam Tibi 
(1998) and Jack Donnely (2003) and argue that the Western origin of human rights discourse 
does not limit their applicability.  By the same token, Shari’a may offer a useful set of laws for 
Western society.  This dialectic is crucial to cross-cultural dialog.  While noting the potential 
societal benefits of both Shari'a law and the Universal Declaration, I must reject the notion that 
either is an effective means of ensuring human rights in the Middle East and North Africa in 
their  current  forms.   This  false  dichotomy  is  analogous  to  that  between  universalism  and 
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relativism:   reality  lies  in  the  middle.   It  is  not  the  concept  of  human  rights  that  moderate 
populations in the Middle East and North Africa take issue with but rather the way in which it is 
presented (Halliday 1996).   Modernization and general participation in the world community 
should not require Muslims to import Western or Christian values or deny their own cultural 
heritage  (Haq  2001).   To  ensure  this,  both  Western  and  Arab  workers  are  responsible  for 
separating human rights discourse from colonial influence.  In order to create a human rights 
framework with the political legitimacy of Shari’a and the rhetorical strength of the Universal 
Declaration,  Western human rights advocates must work with their  Muslim counterparts  and 
establish  cross-cultural  dialog.   Using  this  tool,  they  can  work  to  reconcile  the  Universal 
Declaration and Islamic and regional jurisprudence, implementing a viable human rights scheme 
removed from Western domination.  This approach has already led to considerable success in 
Africa, where authors adapted Western human rights documents to their specific cultural needs 
in Botswana, Malawi, and Mozambique (Lindholt 1997).
Other relativist critiques highlight the cultural differences between the Western concept 
of rights  and a non-Western idea of duties.   Superficially,  the difference between rights and 
duties  may appear  to  be  inconsequential,  and  both  seek  to  respectfully  promote  equity.   In 
seeking  to  remain  respectfully  relativistic,  human  rights  advocates  should  not  succumb  to 
orientalism and assume that Western and Middle Eastern human rights schemes are mutually 
exclusive.   We  must  remember  that  neither  camp  is  a  homogenized  bloc  incapable  of 
understanding  the  other's  concept  of  preserving  dignity.   Nonetheless,  subtle  inconsistencies 
become enormously important when using cross cultural dialog to advance a culturally respectful 
human rights plan.  Like other holy texts, including the Ten Commandments and the gospel, the 
Qu'ran deals mostly with duties of people to God, not guaranteed rights.  The rights espoused by 
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the Universal Declaration seek to protect human dignity through a series of protections from an 
authority.
Duties,  like the obligation to give charity and provide for one's family,  imply human 
dignity but they do not explicitly necessitate it.  Duties also offer no protection from authority 
but instead assume that authority will act benevolently.  In this context, the "question whether the 
notion of duty contains within it the notion of right is complex.  A right does imply a duty but it 
is  critical  to  the idea  of  human rights  that  the right  exists  independently  of  and prior  to  its 
correlative duty.   The centrality of duty in Islam is not a mere difference in emphasis  but a 
judgment  that  rights  are  less  important  between  duties"  (Dalacoura  1998:57).   Because  this 
description is somewhat simplistic and denies the viability of rights generally,  other scholars 
(Donnely 2003, Mayer 1998) have criticized such discrepancies.  However, I feel that critics on 
both sides are complicating the issue.  The current use of duties to protect human dignity is not 
effective because its enforcement falls to a few political activists who rely on radicalized Islam 
to maintain power.  A survey of the prisons throughout the region will show that duties are not 
sufficient to protect the rights of the incarcerated.  This discrepancy inspires Western action. 
Because this  action may be unsolicited  or present a  challenge the political  authority,  it  may 
appear  to be a  form of Western subjugation  and further  encourage Islamism (Bhutto 2008). 
Rights and duties intersect in their respect for human dignity and intent to protect it.  Utilizing 
cross cultural  dialog, this common ground can serve as a base for Western and non-Western 
human  rights  workers  to  implement  the  culturally  established  system of  duties  to  guarantee 
human rights in practical context.
Those who use duties as a justification to deny human rights often do so to obviate any 
political challenge to their authority (Mayer 1998).  Similarly, many leaders in the developing 
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world claim that economic development must precede adequate human rights, an argument often 
voiced  by those  who encourage  industrial  investment  at  the  expense  of  their  environmental 
resources.  There is a certain logic to this argument as much of the West industrialized at the 
expense of human and environmental rights.  But global dynamics have changed drastically since 
Western  industrialization.   Transnational  entities  including  corporations  and  politically 
influential organizations controlled mostly by Northern nations have shaped the global economy 
such that Southern nations feel pressured to choose between economic success and human rights 
(Hernendez-Truyol 2002).  Sudden economic liberalization most often leads to a sudden increase 
in capital for certain classes while perpetuating the exploitation of the rest, especially women 
(Monshipouri 1998, Gruenbaum 2001).  Civil and political rights need not and should not be 
suspended to  provide  for  economic  rights.   As with the  false  'Full  Belly  Thesis'  offered  by 
African leaders and described by Rhonda Howard (1983), such action is often a ploy to maintain 
power  and  deny  political  opposition.   Ignoring  popular  demand  for  civil  and  political 
participation can also be an effective way to draw on colonial  resentment,  as the West may 
appear to deny economic development in human rights discourse advocating universal values.
The rights that such leaders claim are so ill-suited to their culture and heritage, such as 
free press or gender equality, rarely limit the powerful or wealthy.  Whether on the national on 
personal level, those who claim cultural difference as a justification for violent crimes like rape 
or for beating one’s children invoke an orientalist notion of culture and the other.  This claim 
presumes that the offender’s culture is unchanging, untouched by modernity, globalization, or 
liberal  trends.   Perversely,  it  defines  culture  in  the  same  barbaric  and backward stereotypes 
imposed  upon  it  by  colonialist  thought.   Responding  to  Susan  Okin’s  1999  essay  Is  
Multiculturalism Bad for Women, Katha Pollit (1999) references prominent court cases in which 
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immigrants  from  numerous  backgrounds  successfully  eluded  domestic  abuse  charges  by 
claiming to be “naive products of a rigid, static society” (Pollit 1999:28).  She continues, arguing 
that immigrants from countries perceived as modern, such as Italy or Russia, would be unable to 
defend  themselves  in  this  manner.   However,  in  accepting  national  borders,  legal  codes, 
capitalism, or immigration bureaucracy,  among any number of new and culturally unfamiliar 
systems,  those  who  hide  behind  cultural  exceptionalism  for  violent  crimes  betray  their 
adaptability to the globalization.  Thus, it seems clear that this claim is less a maintenance of 
heritage than an excuse to keep power, whether this manifests in familial patriarchy or political 
leadership.   Transnational  business  and economic  rights  are  respected:   one  wonders  if  the 
political leaders that support gender inequality on Islamic grounds also refuse to pay interest on 
national loans.  Indeed, the Qu’ranic restrictions on collecting interest, which could extend to 
everything from national debts to credit card payments, are far less ambiguous than those used to 
justify patriarchy.  Such claims have, at best, a tenuous base in historical or religious reality, as 
will be discussed further below.  
Martha Nussbaum And The Capabilities Approach
In  attempting  to  reconcile  preferential  rights,  cultural  difference,  and  postcolonial 
resentment, it becomes clear that anthropologists must have a widely applicable and respectful 
philosophical  basis  from which  to  initiate  cross-cultural  dialog.   A variety  of  human  rights 
schemes may attempt to define a series of rights, as with the UDHR, advise Western solutions, as 
with American democratization policies, or advise noninterference altogether, as with extreme 
cultural relativists.  I have already criticized extreme relativism for its unwillingness to address 
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human  rights  abuses  and  extreme  universalism  for  its  inherent  ethnocentrism.   However,  a 
number of moderate schemes can fail when applied to the diversity of human rights abuses.  As 
Sen and Nussbaum note (Nussbaum 2006), large-scale examinations will often prove to be faulty 
as well.  Economists and global institutions determine human rights abuses by examining visible 
statistics, like GNP or income distribution (Sen 1973).  GNP and welfare economic methods can 
be useful when comparing state resources, but this data does not inform advocates about the 
actual lives of the people in these countries.  Nor does it account for interpersonal distributions, 
the economic gaps between individuals within states.
Approaches  that  focus  on  rights  tend  to  be  absolute,  impersonal,  and  Western. 
Furthermore, rights language tends to highlight negative rights, the ‘freedoms from’.   This is 
especially evident in the American constitution, which emerged from Enlightenment-style fear of 
government control.  Rights schemes are inadequate for both the individual’s right to happiness 
and the family’s right to love and protection.   They articulate procedures that may lead to a 
specific outcome, rather than beginning with a desirable outcome and leaving the procedures 
open-ended.  Approaches that focus on utilities do not consider that people have variable needs 
and variable access.  Focusing on human entitlements tends to focus on what people need, not 
what they could have.  By the same token, rights schemes that focus on human functioning focus 
on what people do and are, not what they could potentially do and be.  At the same time, failing 
to articulate rights entirely will not fight global inequality.  Although rights language has been 
unhelpful, defining a series of basic human necessities is not inherently unproductive.  Such a 
baseline is useful because it gives human rights advocates a measure by which to assess potential 
human rights violations.  
As a discipline, anthropology has had a troubled history with human rights discourse. 
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Unwilling to endorse early rights systems because of their Western bias, anthropologists have 
remained  split  on  this  issue,  with  prominent  scholars  arguing  for  cultural  relativism, 
universalism, and many viewpoints that  lie somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. 
Without  a  sense  of  clarity,  anthropology  will  be  unable  to  contribute  to  the  human  rights 
movement.  Yet anthropology’s attention to cultural diversity and unique knowledge of cross-
cultural relations should help to inform any global movement, ensuring that native voices are 
well-represented  and  cultural  heritage  is  preserved.   Anthropology  will  not  achieve  this 
introspectively;  human rights is an especially contentious issue and no single philosophy has 
risen  to  prominence.   Other  social  sciences  have  offered  various  models,  but  they  lack  the 
cultural sensitivity that characterizes anthropological theory.    
What anthropologists  need, then,  is a system that can articulate human needs without 
imposing  Western  rights  while  remaining  versatile  enough to  preserve cultural  meaning and 
apply to individuals across the world. I favor the capabilities approach articulated by economist 
Amartya Sen (1973) and furthered by philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2002, 2006).  As the name 
suggests,  this  human  rights  scheme  is  designed  around  the  ability  to  fulfill  individual  and 
community potential.  Rather than focus on the individual’s relationship to the state, capabilities 
begin with the assumption that human rights are based on dignity, ability, and possibility. As a 
result, they are more concerned with personal qualities of life. This approach is unique in that it 
focuses exclusively on human capabilities, what people, or groups of people, are actually capable 
of being or doing.  Capabilities are distinct from rights, entitlements, and utilities because they 
encompass human possibility.  They stand juxtaposed to rights laws in that their purpose is fixed 
but their actual implementation depends on the situation in question.  Actors who follow this 
model articulate their final outcome but allow the procedures that create this outcome to remain 
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vague.   Their  advantage lies  in that  capabilities  address positive freedoms,  can infiltrate  the 
private and public spheres, and are not linked to Enlightenment philosophy (Nussbaum 2006). 
Thus,  while  traditional  sociopolitical  contracts  have  focused  on  procedures  that  maintain  a 
balance of power, capabilities encourage a result, equality and dignity, that focuses primarily on 
human  well-being.   When  examining  human  rights,  I  contend  that  advocates  can  be  more 
effective when they concentrate on helping people achieve their human potential,  in terms of 
physical,  mental,  emotional,  and  social  fulfillment.   This  tool  is  especially  useful  for 
anthropologists navigating human rights discourse or cultural politics because the capabilities 
approach requires advocates to be cultural specialists. 
Nussbaum explicitly lists ten base capabilities, which she believes to be necessary for 
human functioning.  These capabilities form a baseline, against which human rights advocates 
can measure well-being.  Her list of central human capabilities encompasses:  the ability to live 
one’s life; the capability to promote personal bodily health; the capability for bodily integrity 
including reproductive freedom; full expression of sensory perception including imagination and 
thought; emotional expression; the ability to employ practical reason with regard to one’s life; 
the ability to affiliate with social groups and individuals without fear of reprisal; being able to 
live  harmoniously  with  the  natural  world;  enjoying  rest,  play,  and  recreation;  the  ability  to 
exercise  some  control  over  one’s  life,  through  some  combination  of  political  participation, 
cultural  or  religious  expression,  unhindered  access  to  the  economic  system,  and meaningful 
social relationships (Nussbaum 2006).  People who express these basic capabilities can be seen 
as above this human baseline while people below this baseline may suffer human rights abuses. 
Nussbaum’s central capabilities differ from other rights lists in that they are intentionally vague 
and open to interpretation.  Rather than define what it means to live a good life, the capabilities 
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list asks only that people are able to live one.  This necessitates an anthropological understanding 
of what that life would entail in multiple settings.  In this way, each capability can be interpreted 
in distinct cultural contexts without losing its essential meaning.  In this way, the capabilities 
approach is equipped to navigate universalism and cultural relativism.  However, because the 
essential  meaning  remains  the  same  cross-culturally,  advocates  can  know,  and  thus  defend, 
human capabilities.  
In  Nussbaum’s  worldview,  as  articulated  in  The  Frontiers  of  Justice (2006),  these 
essential capabilities are guarded by state and nonstate actors.  Drawing on a liberal political 
science  philosophy,  she  argues  that  global  institutions  are  capable  of  watching  states  and 
identifying areas that need human rights support.  However, she stresses that states are ultimately 
responsible for helping improve the global structure.  In this way, the responsibility for global 
well-being is a shared among actors that have the power to effect change.  States can do this 
through policy, institutionalizing positive rights, or they can contribute material aid to areas with 
a demonstrated need.  Nussbaum believes that transnational institutions are capable of assessing 
this need, in accordance with the capabilities approach.  In such a process, both people affected 
by a perceived human rights violation and outside observers must work together to ensure that 
any outside response is both wanted and effective.   By working together,  outside actors can 
overcome  any  sense  of  moral  imperialism  while  the  disaffected  can  realize  their  double 
consciousness.  It is important to note that Nussbaum stresses that her model does not provide a 
grounds for interference.   The capabilities  are  not  designed to  spur  international  agents  into 
action.  Rather, they provide a framework within which international groups, states, and those 
affected by human rights violations can begin cross-cultural dialog.   
Although Nussbaum writes mostly about women and women's rights, I believe that the 
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capabilities  approach  can  be  extended  to  men,  women,  and  transgendered  persons.   By 
examining the political,  social,  and economic realities that  constrain a realization of specific 
goals, it provides a realistic vantage point from which to view potential human rights abuses. 
Other indicators like GNP, economic development, political expression, or even asylum requests 
can be misleading because they presuppose Western values.  Judging by income standards, one 
could conclude that successful hunter-gatherer societies exist in tragic poverty while a city that 
undergoes  sudden  economic  liberalization,  deepens  class  divides,  and  compromises 
environmental standards seeks to fight social inequality (Sen 1999).  Such an approach implies 
that human rights issues can have a quick, easy, or merely economic resolution.  But real change 
must be gradual, as with any shift in thinking.  The capabilities approach examines human rights 
within their cultural context, investigating "not only about the person's satisfaction with what she 
does,  but  about  what  she does,  and what  she is  in a  position to  do" (Nussbaum 2002:129). 
Building off of Nussbaum and Sen's work, other authors (Gruenbaum 2001, Talbott 2005) have 
argued for an autonomy-based human rights scheme.  The most useful aspect of the capabilities 
approach is its emphasis on individual context.  Rather than impose values on other societies, it 
examines potential human rights abuses from within local, enculturated standards.  While other, 
more general models use statistics based on human beings as the basis for their observation, it 
directly investigates the grievances of those people.  For this reason, the capabilities approach is 
uniquely situated to provide a philosophical base for cross cultural dialog.
Proponents of cultural  relativism criticize Nussbaum’s system because it  claims to be 
universally applicable.  By forwarding a system of rights at all, it supposes that one existence can 
be superior to another.  In addition, focusing on individual autonomy, it ignores communal and 
familial rights.  These are legitimate anthropological criticisms, but I feel that they miss some of 
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Nussbaum’s essential meaning.  Yes, capabilities are unabashedly universalist, but their basis is 
not in the Western political tradition.  In fact,  the rights to free affiliation and a harmonious 
existence  with  one’s  environment  are  decidedly  contrary  to  European  and  North  American 
tradition,  as  evidenced  by  institutional  racism  and  the  environmental  devastation  that  has 
sustained these societies.  Furthermore, Nussbaum’s list is intentionally non-specific and open to 
revision.  Capabilities are designed to be interpreted within distinct cultural contexts and applied 
to the variable need that they express.  On a culturally specific level, human existence cannot be 
compared,  and anthropological  work has  shown that  people  are  products  of  the culture  that 
surrounds them.  However, the capabilities  approach argues that only an ideal life,  in which 
capabilities  are fulfilled,  is superior to other existences.   The capabilities approach is neither 
willing nor equipped to criticize cultural  structures,  only the way that people are able to act 
within  them.   Nussbaum demands  only that  all  cultures  express  respect  for  human  life  and 
dignity, the human rights outcome.  She does not seek to impose her own values on how this 
respect can be expressed, the human rights procedure.  This is the very essence of a relativist-
tempered universalism.
I feel that one aspect of Nussbaum’s argument does require special attention.  In an effort 
to preserve individual autonomy, the capabilities approach also possesses a strong individualist 
tilt.  Her discussion glosses over the rights of families and other communal networks.  In fact, 
citing institutional patriarchy,  Nussbaum notes that families often stifle women’s capabilities. 
However, I feel that Nussbaum is wrong to exclude communal rights from her list.  Group rights 
including self determination, the right to familial safety and privacy, and religious expression, 
can work within her rights framework as outlined above.  As numerous authors (Mahoney, 2007, 
Moussalli  2001, Sahliyeh  2003) note,  families  and large societal  networks have traditionally 
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been  excluded  by  human  rights  discourse.   As  with  Nussbaum,  groups  are  portrayed  as 
aggressors.  However, families and groups require similar protections in order to fulfill their own 
capabilities.  An extreme and individualist interpretation of Nussbaum’s argument could lead to 
misinformed conclusions about social structures.
Although they form an important part of the international human rights movement, non-
state groups have no explicit rights to statehood under the capabilities approach.  Ethno-national 
groups such as the Tibetans and the Palestinians have tried to invoke the communal right of self-
determination.   When examined  as  part  of  the  capabilities  approach,  anthropologists  should 
conclude that such groups have intrinsic rights to dignity, not to live as second-class citizens, that 
are covered by Nussbaum’s list.  Political expression of this kind is more a matter of recognition 
by the global community,  economic and resource rights on the national  level,  and numerous 
international  laws  and  treaties.   It  transcends  both  the  ethical  needs  of  individuals  and  the 
fulfillment of human capabilities.
This is not to say that self determination issues are unrelated to human rights issues.  By 
denying a group nationality, the state can commit any number of atrocities, from denying full 
economic or political rights to outlawing language.  The capabilities approach is well equipped 
to  address  these  particular  violations,  potential  consequences  of  state-sponsored 
disenfranchisement.  However, owing to its wide-ranging international political and economic 
ramifications,  self-determination  itself  lies  beyond  the  scope  of  the  capabilities  approach. 
However, it is equipped to deal with other types of groups that would benefit from an individual, 
case-by-case  examination  of  potential  disenfranchisement.   While  it  is  beyond  Nussbaum’s 
philosophy to advocate for political secession, she can speak to state policies as they affect a 
current group, be it religious, familial, or ethnic.  Fulfillment of capabilities may well lead to 
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self-governance,  but  this  is  a  procedure  and as  such it  is  not  specifically  argued for  by the 
capabilities framework.  The capabilities approach is based in a social contract between leaders 
and communities, namely states and individuals residing within them.  The ultimate goal is not to 
appease every political, economic, or even social aspiration, but rather to create an environment 
of  equal  potential  for  fulfillment.   By applying  these  rules  to  such  groups,  the  capabilities 
approach becomes both more versatile and encompassing.  By remaining rigidly individualistic, 
the capabilities approach can actually do more harm than good.
In  many  settings,  the  family  is  a  beneficial  structure  from  an  individual  and  group 
perspective.   Although it  sets  certain  restrictions  on individual  liberties,  can  anthropologists 
consider  these  human  rights  abuses?   Many  families  protect,  nurture,  and  care  for  group 
members.   American parents who give their children curfews do not do so to stifle personal 
freedoms.  Rather, they hope to ensure their children’s’ safety.  Abusive parents who lock their 
children  in  their  rooms  have  crossed  a  vague  boundary  and  committed  a  human  rights 
infringement.  While this situation should not cause human rights advocates to conclude that the 
family is an intrinsically bad institution, it calls attention to the ways that groups must be treated 
with nuance in rights discourse.  Fortunately, the capabilities approach is distinctly contextual.  I 
contend that both families and individuals are intrinsically worthy of dignity and respect.  As 
such, they should both share Nussbaum’s capabilities.  The most reliable way of ensuring that 
such groups do not oppress their members would be to examine context and the anthropological 
meaning of questionable actions.
Nussbaum herself addresses another potential critique of her philosophy in  A Plea for  
Difficulty, an essay that responds to Susan Okin’s  Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women (1999). 
For the religious, the capabilities could be seen as another secular attack that seeks to undermine 
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traditions  including dress or the gender of the clergy.   More secular critics ask the opposite 
questions: at what point is religion harmful to the individual?  Does religion hamper personal 
capabilities?  Do religious rights, customs, and ethical standards conflict with capabilities for 
equity and personal freedom?  Such questions would undoubtedly seem offensive to people who 
see their faith as integral to their lives.  However, this issue is not as philosophically complicated 
as it may appear.  The secular critique is ultimately misguided, because it assumes that “religion 
has nothing positive to contribute to the struggle for justice, and perhaps to life more generally” 
(Nussbaum 1999:107).  In validating such a denial of religious thought, the argument not only 
limits  the  human  and group capabilities  for  spiritual  expression,  it  damages  the  attempts  of 
religious activists who draw on their faith to combat inequity.  Nussbaum cites Ela Bhatt and 
Gandhi, both of whom drew on Hindu philosophy to combat the abuses of the colonial British, 
but  the list  extends  to  Dr.  Martin  Luther  King Jr.,  Frederick  Douglas,  and  Mother  Theresa, 
among countless others.   The capabilities  approach demands that people be able to live in a 
pluralist environment where both religious and secular viewpoints are respected.
To this end, she notes that while a philosophical liberal  like herself might lament the 
exclusion of women from the Catholic clergy, the kind of political liberalism that she espouses in 
the capabilities approach would not allow such an imposition into church dogma  (Nussbaum 
1999).  This exclusion does not prevent women from practicing religion and so does not infringe 
upon a  base  capability,  however  unfair  or  even unjust  it  may  seem to  the  liberal  observer. 
Claiming so runs the risk of imposing a normative value without any respect to the cultural 
legacy of  Catholicism and opens  the  door  for  any  normative  value  judgments  against  other 
societies.  The value of the capabilities approach lies in its ability to draw a boundary between 
human rights abuses and seemingly improper practices.  The example of female clergy in the 
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Catholic  tradition  illustrates  the  necessity  for  an  assessment  of  severity  and  a  cultural 
appreciation for the practice in question.
That  said,  the  secular  argument  correctly  critiques  certain  patriarchal  and 
disenfranchising structures employed by religious groups.  However, rather than solely blame 
religion, I believe this argument speaks to one of the central themes of this paper.  The religious 
practices  that  interfere  with  human  capabilities  result  from  dubiously  authentic  historical 
practices.  They arise, continue, and are revived as powerful people gain control over others. 
The result is less a religious and moral institution, but rather one that reflects the political and 
socioeconomic will of these elites.  Reform does not call for a restructuring of religion itself, but 
rather the re-examination of these historical  practices.  As Muslim feminists, Gandhians, and 
religious liberals of all kinds argue, reform aims to draw religious groups closer to the true moral 
and ideological tenets of spirituality and religion itself.
Cultural politics aside, the issue of religious freedom is an especially difficult issue to 
deal with as a human rights advocate, anthropologist, or proponent of the capabilities approach. 
Free religious expression is not just one of the fundamental capabilities – it has a long history in 
liberal philosophy.  But, taken to an extreme, work toward religious freedom can lead to the 
claim  of  religious  exceptionalism.   However,  human  rights  philosophy  and  the  capabilities 
approach insist that no person can be stripped of their humanity on religious grounds.  Once 
again there is a need for some kind of scale to measure the difference.  To counter religious 
exceptionalists,  Nussbaum  argues  that  the  basic  protection  of  human  life  and  happiness 
supersede the need to continue historical or traditional practices.  For her, God is just and does 
not order humans to debase others; rather that mandate comes from other humans and carries 
neither divine nor supernatural authority.  Nussbaum continues this argument, claiming:
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          To those who object that violating others is part of the free exercise of their  
religion, we should reply as we do when a murder claims that God told him to do 
it (and he may sincerely believe this to be true):  Never mind, we say, there are 
some things we do not allow people to do to other people.  Or as the Bangladeshi 
wife said in my epigraph, if Allah really said that, then he is dead wrong.  (What 
we really mean by saying such things is that a just God cannot possibly have said 
such things.) (Nussbaum 1999:102)
The case of religiously justified abuse shows a potential for a clash of capabilities, in which one 
right is used to legitimize the violation of another.  However, the full set of capabilities must be 
met if one is to fulfill their human potential.
That which the capabilities approach to human rights seeks to protect is the human.  This 
is not a scheme for the equal protection of ideas or ideologies, because these can be used to 
justify  actions  that  limit  functioning  or  capabilities.   This  framework  maintains  that  the 
protection of human capabilities supersedes the protection of larger ideas.  That is, tradition is no 
excuse for torture.  Those extreme views that cause members of a society to harm and unequally 
treat  their  fellow community  members  cannot  be  tolerated  or  respected  when  their  rhetoric 
becomes a tangible threat.  No matter how sincere, human rights supporters and anthropologists 
should and must oppose any actions that threaten the equality of the community.   
The capabilities approach entails several key assumptions that inform its conclusions on 
human rights issues.  First, it assumes that all human life is valuable and that all people have 
intrinsic worth by merit of their humanity alone.  In the just world that human rights advocates 
work to create, there is no natural state in which one human is inferior or superior to another.  All 
people are fundamentally equal and possess an equal degree of worth.  This is the key value of 
respect, in which actors value each other’s culture and history and approach cross cultural dialog 
from a position of equality.  This value is indisputable and no cultural relativism can challenge 
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this basic tenet.  Thus, the relativist critique that guards against imposition cannot threaten one’s 
humanity.   Women, men,  and transgendered people of all  religions,  ethnic backgrounds, and 
cultures possess inalienable human dignity,  and deserve to have that dignity respected.   This 
belief comes from Nussbaum’s familiarity the works of John Rawls and John Stuart Mill, who 
considered dignity, equality, and respect to be key foundations for human rights, and from her 
conviction  in  Humanism  (Nussbaum,  1999).   I  would  hope  that  anthropologists  could 
comfortably endorse this assumption.
As a ramification of this assumption, the capabilities approach also assumes that pluralist 
society is beneficial.  By pluralist, I refer to a society in which all people can coexist peacefully, 
in which no single demographic asserts an advantage over another by virtue of sex, heritage, 
sexual orientation, religion, or cultural background.  Pluralism only ensures that the full diversity 
of a population can affect  its own well-being.   The capabilities  approach does not offer any 
specific means of achieving this environment and, rather than being western-centric, criticizes 
American and European states for their hierarchical societies.  Because it violates the capability 
for a full and dignified life, violence must be viewed as detrimental to human existence.  Thus, 
the  capabilities  approach  would  have  anthropologists  universally  condemn  acts  of  injustice 
against any people, despite a cultural precedent.  In order for an individual to recognize injustice, 
they must be aware of their own situation and of an alternative.  The individual must then be able 
to make a competent value judgment to determine if his or her capabilities are being limited by 
the situation in question.  In short, the capabilities approach is dependent upon sufficient access 
to resources, be it some form of education or other way of evaluating one’s potential human 
rights  abuse  in  context.   In  this  way,  the  individual  can  ensure  that  their  choice  is  neither 
spontaneous nor already decided by an outside force (Nussbaum 1995).  That is, the capabilities 
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approach relies on one’s ability to form a double-consciousness.
Finally, it assumes that individual rights are centrally important, as explained above.  As 
such, groups are institutions through which individual rights can be respected or denied.  Thus 
group rights fit with the capabilities approach only when they do not seek to compromise one’s 
personal autonomy.  Nussbaum does not support a tyranny of the majority; on the other hand, 
history shows that family ties can be enormously helpful in protecting individuals from social 
and physical dangers.  A person’s stated desire, as identified by NGOs and ethnographers alike, 
is  an  insufficient  guide  for  rights  workers  when  compared  to  their  actual  functioning  and 
abilities.  Therefore, any individual rights, as expressed through capabilities, cannot impinge on 
the rights of others, limit their capabilities, or hamper one’s perspective when forming a double-
consciousness.   
I  argue  the  idea  that  cultural  politics,  the  way  in  which  culture  is  represented  and 
appropriated  by  both  authoritarian  regimes  and  human  rights  advocates,  and  postcolonial 
political and socioeconomic factors, is responsible for a perceived incompatibility between Islam 
and  human  rights.   Furthermore  the  capabilities  approach  is  uniquely  situated  to  deal  with 
ambiguous rights or rights pertaining to cultural  artifacts.  Three case studies are particularly 
valuable  for addressing these gray area rights:   female genital  cutting,  the veil,  and ideas of 
democracy.  Each of these cultural constructions are often perceived as human rights issues by 
Western observers looking to the Middle East and North Africa.  While traditional human rights 
or feminist  approaches tend to frame these as simple problems, easily remedied by informed 
activists,  the  capabilities  approach  enables  human  rights  advocates  to  fully  realize  their 
complexity and cultural significance.  With this relativistic outlook, we can appropriately engage 
in cross cultural dialog and work toward a positive outcome.  This will recognize the political, 
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economic, and social fabric surrounding the veil, female genital cutting, and democracy while 
providing the tools to better understand them.
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, veiling and female genital cutting can be 
interpreted as human rights violations under the articles guaranteeing the right to personal liberty 
and security (article 3), forbidding degrading treatment (article 5), forbidding interference with 
privacy and family (article 12), freedom of opinion and expression (article 19), and guaranteeing 
security of family and motherhood (article 25).  From this, one could conclude that these cultural 
articles  are  incompatible  with  human  rights  law.   However,  I  contend  that  the  Universal 
Declaration is merely ill-equipped to address these perceived incompatibilities.  In examining 
these issues, I will investigate the historical, cultural, social, economic, and political significance 
of each while reinforcing that culture itself is fully equipped to fulfill autonomous capabilities.
Female Genital Cutting
Female genital cutting is one of the most hotly contested human rights issues in North 
Africa,  in part  because it  is defended as a cultural  right.   Western feminist  groups, women's 
rights activists, African governments, and the World Health Organization have all criticized this 
practice  while  individual  communities,  including  the  women,  insist  on  the  procedure.   Its 
relationship with Islam is complicated and ambiguous, and its original significance in cultural 
constructions of gender and adulthood has become appropriated by postcolonial discourse.  In 
short it can be seen as both an abuse and a right, depending on one’s orientation within cultural 
politics.
The  term  itself  is  subject  to  scrutiny.   Depending  on  one's  perspective,  it  is  called 
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circumcision,  cutting,  or  mutilation.   Designating  the  practice  circumcision  draws  a  false 
comparison  to  male  circumcision,  a  procedure  far  less  dangerous  or  invasive.   Although  I 
personally believe that mutilation is often accurate, the word's severity and connotations insult 
the  tradition,  its  cultural  meaning,  and  the  people  who  perform  the  procedure  without 
distinguishing between mild and severe forms.  Mutilation, although strong enough to capture 
the imagination of Western human rights advocates,  is an impractical  term for cross cultural 
dialog.  I use 'cutting' because it accurately describes the process without passing judgment.
Female genital cutting (FGC) is not a single, defined procedure.  As a blanket term, the 
World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) issued an April 1997 joint statement defining FGC as "all 
procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to 
the female genital organs whether for cultural or other non-therapeutic reasons" (WHO 1998:6). 
As a procedure, FGC has a considerable range with respect to severity and tradition.  Several 
sources (Skaine 2005, Billet 2007, WHO 1998, Gruenbaum 2001, El Guindi 2006) agree on four 
variable  methods of  FGC.  The first  method,  clitoridectomy,  is  the most  common and least 
severe.  Most often, the clitoral prepuce is cut and the clitoris may be pricked, cut, or removed. 
Classified  as  Sunna,  or  tradition,  this  is  the  method  that  Mohammed  encountered,  which 
subsequent Muslims defend on Islamic grounds.  The second method, excision, is more variable. 
Excision involves the removal of all or part of the clitoris as well as the all or part of the labia 
minora.  Subsequent scarring may cover the vaginal opening.  According to the WHO (1998), 
methods one and two account for 80-85% of FGC procedures.  Type three is the most severe and 
invasive,  known alternately as pharonic circumcision,  Sudanese circumcision,  or infibulation. 
During this procedure, most or all of the external genital tissue is removed.  The remaining tissue 
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is then sewn back in place while the legs are bound to ensure that the wound heals properly.  The 
resulting scar covers most of the vagina, creating a physical barrier for intercourse.  The people 
performing the procedure leave an opening that allows menstrual blood and urine to flow.  The 
fourth category covers all other procedures not previously discussed by the other three, including 
stretching, piercing, pricking, cauterizing, other cutting, or introducing corrosive materials to the 
genitals.   This  involved  and  potentially  dangerous  process  remains  in  place  because  of  its 
historical precedent, cultural importance, and socioeconomic function.
FGC has a long history, one that predates both Islam and the nation-state.  The earliest 
documented accounts show that FGC was practiced in North Africa well before Christ's birth. 
The process is old enough to have lost its original tribal affiliation, and historians speculate that 
it could have originated anywhere from the heart of Africa to Phoenicia.  Certainly, FGC spread 
to  Egypt  by 484 B.C.,  as  archaeologists  have uncovered mummies  displaying  the procedure 
(Billet  2207).   Greek explorers  noted the process throughout the Red Sea area and a  Greek 
papyrus dating from 163 B.C. describes FGC as a necessary marriage rite (Billet 2007, Skaine 
2005).   Many communities  believe  that  the  process  began  with  Islam or  that  Muslims  are 
responsible for its prevalence (Billet 2007, El Guindi 2006).   Ayaan Ali (2007) suggests that 
Islam's emphasis on purity perpetuates FGC, but historically speaking, this is equally due to a 
geographic  coincidence.   I  should  note  that  in  some  rural  areas,  Jewish  and  Christian 
communities are also enculturated to perform FGC, although no major texts mention it (Billet 
2007, Saadawi 1997).  Geographic affinity proves to be a more accurate predictor of the process 
than religion.  The Koran does not explicitly mention FGC (Billet 2007, Saadawi 1997, Abu-
Sahlieh 2006), so the Islamic connection stems forms Mohammed's sayings in the Hadith.  When 
he encountered FGC, the prophet neither advised nor condemned it, leaving it as an option for 
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communities; in the event that it was practiced, Mohammed advised that the women take care 
not to go "too far".  Some Muslims argue that because they trace their descent through Ishmael, 
son of Abraham and Hagar, and Hagar underwent FGC, the practice is a part of their heritage 
(Abu-Sahlieh 2006).  Although this may appear to provide an Islamic sanction, El Guindi notes 
(2006) that most Muslims see this explanation as somewhat weak.  Rather, because the Sunna 
version of the procedure did not conflict with Islam, it kept its traditional place in the new world 
order.  It is also important to note that not all Muslim states practice FGC, including Pakistan, 
Algeria,  Tunisia,  Saudi  Arabia,  Iran,  and  Iraq  (Nussbaum  1999).   Owing  to  the  religious 
character of states like Iran and Saudi Arabia, one can see that religion plays a secondary role to 
tradition.
Although  some  doctors  and  scholars  in  the  East  and  West  debated  the  issue,  FGC 
remained primarily in the personal realm, as with male circumcisions.   The process is not a 
solely  Islamic  practice.   In  more  recent  times,  European  and  American  doctors  performed 
clitoridectomies  as  late  as  the  1950s  for  "improving  female  mental  health,  discouraging 
lesbianism, and reducing the incidence of masturbation" (Maguigan 2002:242).  In the light of 
postcolonialism, some communities have taken offense to Western human rights workers who do 
not appreciate FGC's cultural significance, viewing human rights discourse as a new means of 
denial  and  oppression  (Gruenbaum 2001).   Regardless  of  their  geographic  origin,  the  actual 
procedures of FGC remain relatively unchanged since their beginning.  By contrast, the original 
cultural significance of FGC has become largely appropriated by cultural politics.
FGC primarily functions as a rite of passage that prepares girls for puberty and marriage. 
Although the world has changed since FGC began, it continues to serve this purpose.  When 
examined  through  a  cultural  lens,  the  ideal  procedure,  unaffected  by  political,  social,  or 
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economic forces, takes place as part of a ritualized coming of age ceremony.  As described by 
John Mbiti (1990) and Ellen Gruenbaum (2001), the local community gathers to welcome the 
girls into adult society.  This ceremony is complete with a party, food, drink, ululation, dancing, 
and even presents.   Mbiti  and Gruenbaum cite  the belief  that  children are born with gender 
ambiguity.   This liminality is physically expressed in boys through their foreskin and in girls 
through their external genitalia.  In speaking about the Akamba, an ethnic group from Kenya, 
Mbiti writes:
The  cutting  of  the  skin  from  the  sexual  organs  symbolizes  and  dramatizes 
separation from childhood:  it is parallel to the cutting of the umbilical cord when 
the child is born.  The sexual organ attaches the child to the state of ignorance, the 
state of inactivity and the state of potential impotence (asexuality).  But once that 
link  is  severed,  the  young  person  is  freed  from  that  state  of  ignorance  and 
inactivity.   He is  born into another state,  which is the stage of knowledge,  of 
activity,  of  reproduction.   So  long as  a  person is  not  initiated,  he  cannot  get 
married and he is not supposed to reproduce or bear children (Mbiti 1990:120).
Genital cutting, in boys and girls, is designed to foster group identity and responsibility.  For 
girls, it symbolizes a mature readiness to bear children, contributing to the community's survival. 
Gruenbaum (2001) notes that communities may ostracize people who do not undergo genital 
cutting.   Ethnic identity,  family loyalty,  and sexuality all  come into question when a person 
refuses to initiate.
Certain Middle East and North African communities place a significant cultural value on 
virginity  before  marriage  (Ali  2007,  Gruenbaum  2001).   This  increases  the  dowry  and 
symbolizes  the  community's  moral  conviction.   The  infibulation  procedures  serve  a  social 
purpose as physical  chastity belts,  projecting the girl's  virginity and community's  honor.  As 
Gruenbaum  shows,  because  the  scar  tissue  would  not  actually  prevent  sexual  activity, 
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infibulation does not ensure virginity itself, but rather the idea of virginity.  For the woman in 
question, FGC is a lasting, physical reminder of this communal commitment to morality, purity, 
ethnicity, and responsibility. 
Fadwa El Guindi's work (2006) with the Copts in Egypt suggests a physical motivation as 
well.  El Guindi notes that women see uncut genitalia as ugly and primitive.  By contrast, women 
who do undergo FGC are seen as beautiful,  demasculinized,  and religiously pious (Shweder 
2002).  Surprisingly, although many religious and Western observers, including the WHO (1997) 
and  the  men  featured  in  El  Guindi's  research  and  Ellen  Gruenbaum's  2001  ethnography  of 
Sudanese women, view FGC as a process designed to inhibit  sexual activity,  women do not 
appear to suffer a devastating lack of sensitivity or sexual ability.  In fact, both the Copts and the 
Sudanese  women  encountered  by  Gruenbaum believed  that  FGC actually  heightened  sexual 
experience,  especially  for  their  men.   This  rationale  also  reflects  ethnic  pride  and  identity, 
perpetuating a belief that, as a woman told El Guindi, "circumcision makes a woman nice and 
tight.  The man finds great pleasure in tight women, unlike Cairo women whose vaginas are wide 
enough for four men to enter  together"  (El  Guindi 2006:32).   In this  way,  genital  cutting is 
perceived as sexually empowering.
With  all  of  this  cultural  significance,  why  have  the  WHO  (1998),  American  and 
international law (Maguigan 2002), and numerous internal and external women's rights groups 
(Gruenbaum 2001, Skaine 2005) have labeled FGC as a human rights abuse?  The WHO notes 
the following medical complications:  bleeding, shock, infection, urine retention, pain, failure to 
heal,  abscess formation,  dermoid cysts, keloids (scar tissue), UTI, scar neuroma, painful sex, 
increased risk of transmission due to instruments and increased bleeding,  pseudo-infibulation 
(healing  with  vulval  adhesions),  reproductive  tract  infections,  dysmenorrhoea  (painful 
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menstruation), chronic urinary tract obstruction, urinary incontinence, stenosis of the artificial 
opening of the vagina, complications of labor and delivery, injury to neighboring organs, painful 
sexual intercourse and associations therein,  and susceptibility to disease and infection (WHO 
1998).  FGC is most often performed by midwives or community members rather than trained 
medical  officials  (Gruenbaum 2001,  Skaine  2005),  increasing  risk of  infection,  uncontrolled 
bleeding, and potential tissue damage.  Transferring HIV/AIDS is a notable risk as the people 
performing  the  procedure  often  use  the  same  tools  on  multiple  women  with  only  minimal 
cleaning.  Gruenbaum (2001) observed a women cleaning her tools by placing them in a dish of 
warm water.   This disregard for hygiene is unacceptable  in a region where HIV/AIDS is so 
prevalent.
While women still experience sexual pleasure and stimulation, FGC can greatly reduce 
this sensitivity.  As Ali (2007) notes, sex can be extremely painful as a result of more severe 
procedures,  resulting  in  an  emotional  association  with  pain,  fear,  and  sexuality.   Although 
Richard  Shweder  (2002)  correctly  argues  that  mental  and  emotional  health  after  FGC have 
yielded inconclusive results (Shweder 2002, WHO 1998), I disagree with his assertion that "the 
risk of death associated with these operations compares quite favorably with the risks associated 
with many activities that are routine in our own lives, such as driving a car" (Shweder 2002:232), 
an analogy is flawed on several levels.  Most importantly, the act of driving a car is not intended 
to cause physical harm.  It also compares FGC to a mundane western practice—FGC is anything 
but  routine.   The  process  entails  both  significant  cultural  meaning  and  physical  risk.   In 
comparing FGC to driving a car, Shweder ignores intent.  The dangers of automobiles result 
from accidents and mistakes; the dangers of FGC are inherent in the practice.
With respect to religion, FGC is barely mentioned in any Islamic texts.  The sunna label 
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gives tacit support to the practice but that merely serves to validate an existing tradition rather 
than give any new direction.  Inevitably, this ambiguity gives support to pro-circumcision and 
anti-circumcision advocates.  Ali (2007) agrees, noting that while the Qu'ran offers no persuasive 
commentary  in  favor  of  FGC,  Islam's  traditional  view  of  chastity  and  purity  reinforce  the 
practice as a means of ensuring this morality.  In a survey of contemporary Muslim writing, Abu-
Sahlieh (2006) notes that Islam offers no divine instruction regarding FGC.  At best, the prophet 
observed the practice and religious scholars offered commentary on his  observations in later 
years.  The idea is further complicated by Fadwa El Guindi’s work (2006) with Egyptian Copts, 
a Christian group that practices FGC and lampoons the Muslim women of Cairo.  If we are to 
take a liberal approach to Islamic tradition, then we can conclude, with al-'Ashmawy (1998), that 
humans are fallible and their words are open to interpretation and change.  Thus, Islam does not 
mandate or justify FGC.
And yet, women across the region insist that they and their daughters undergo FGC (El 
Guindi  2006,  Gruenbaum 2001,  Maguigan 2002).   The  cultural  reasons  explored  previously 
explain its symbolic significance but not its perpetuation.  Many cultures perform marriage and 
coming-of-age rites, but few are as potentially dangerous as FGC.  For that explanation, we must 
examine the socioeconomic forces within the communities that practice genital cutting.  In many 
rural areas, women cannot marry without first undergoing this rite of passage.  FGC increases 
their marketability by reinforcing their presumed virginity and purity.  Because this standard is 
not applied to men and, in effect, forces women to undergo genital cutting, I would qualify this 
practice as an extension of institutional patriarchy.
Perpetuated by social structure rather than individual demands, it imposes a potentially 
dangerous surgery on women so that they will be more acceptable for a prospective suitor. While 
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this kind of marital selection is a social decision, it has important legal consequences.  Samuel 
Martinez's 2005 essay Searching for a Middle Path: Rights, Capabilities, and Political Culture  
in the Study of Female Genital Cutting addresses the complications of legal standing for women 
living in this region.  An unmarried woman will have poor social, legal, and economic standing. 
Because of these detriments women in North Africa are often the staunchest supporters of FGC. 
Sudanese women, for example, value the practice because they see “marriage [as] the entry gate 
to family formation. FGC is the ticket to pass through this gate and from thence to gain access to 
respect, a more reliable livelihood, and a stronger assurance of care and subsistence in old age 
than could be obtained by foregoing a socially-legitimate conjugal union” (Martinez 2005:37). 
Women call for this procedure as it may be the only way they can fulfill their full economic 
potential.   Besides  maintaining  their  family's  honor,  married  women  are  able  to  run  their 
household and conduct  business.   Though these are  domestic  goals  they are unattainable  by 
unmarried (uncut) women.
Gruenbaum  and  Martinez  draw  a  parallel  to  the  Chinese  process  of  foot-binding. 
Honorable women bound their feet: “similarly to FGC it was necessary for a proper marriage, for 
the virtue of the woman, and for the honor of her family” (Martinez 2005:36).  Yet human rights 
activism successfully addressed foot-binding without compromising the Asian values of familial 
honor  through a  three-part  education  campaign.   First,  activists  informed  the  Chinese  of  an 
alternative;  that  is knowledge of other cultures that  did not bind feet.   Then they distributed 
information  about  the  detrimental  health  effects  of  foot  binding  in  Chinese  cultural  terms. 
Finally activists encouraged the formation of groups that agreed not to bind their daughter's feet 
and forbade their sons from marrying women with bound feet.
This process eventually leads to the audience theory of culture change.  If an audience is 
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standing, then sitting is both forgotten and inapplicable to the situation.  However once a “critical 
mass of people in the audience can be organized to sit, they realize that they can attain both the 
ease of sitting and a clear enough view of the stage” (Martinez 2005:35).  If enough families 
agree to stop practicing FGC, then they could marry among each other.  Once this “critical mass” 
has been reached, FGC may literally fall  out of fashion.   This may seem simplistic,  but as 
Martinez explains, it succeeded in China.  Of course, China is a product of Asian values while 
African  and Islamic  nations  are  a  product  of  their  own values;  the  foot-binding  example  is 
analogous rather than defining.  However, there are encouraging signs.  Human rights groups 
have successfully implemented health awareness campaigns and designed non-harmful initiation 
rites throughout the Middle East and North Africa (Skaine 2005, Gruenbaum 2001, Billet 2007).
Female Genital Cutting and The Capabilities Approach
Yet something is missing from this explanation, because it begins with the assumption 
that genital cutting is wrong, it’s existence is harmful, and the women who agree to it lack a 
double consciousness that would illuminate their subjugation.  While this may be the ultimate 
conclusion, activists cannot use these assumptions as a starting point.  By allowing FGC to be 
judged in  this  Western,  normative  light,  human rights would open the door for any cultural 
tradition to be scrutinized by the standards of a single moral system.  Rather, Nussbaum provides 
the solution with her capabilities approach.
So what can the women in question do and be?  From the capabilities perspective, the 
genital  cutting  process  allows  women  to  be  functioning  members  of  society.   They  can  be 
mothers and wives, they can feel sexually empowered, they can hold positions in society, and 
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they can be culturally initiated.  For these women, FGC is a necessary part of their social life, 
one that allows them to participate in their economic and political structures.  These capabilities, 
named  by  the  communities  themselves  and  relayed  through  the  cross-cultural  dialog  of 
anthropologists and other fieldworkers, are crucial because they reflect the cultural importance 
ascribed to FGC.  Human rights workers cannot present a lasting alternative solution that ignores 
these.
One value of the capabilities  approach is  in its ability to be reinterpreted in different 
cultural  contexts.   Every  person  has  base  capabilities,  but  they  are  differently  defined  for 
different groups.  By addressing social and economic capabilities, FGC can be seen as necessary 
for some women.  However, another value of this framework lies in its scope.  Nussbaum is 
uncompromising  about  this,  and  her  system  dictates  that  no  capability  can  deny  another. 
Because of the health risks, emotional damage, and patriarchy that is reinforced by the system, 
FGC denies central capabilities related to well-being.  The social gains are negated by a physical 
danger that is unacceptable in modern medical times.  Additionally, the Functionalist argument 
that  genital  cutting  fills  a  social  need  is  dangerously  fatalistic.   The  diversity  of  the 
anthropological  record  shows  that  FGC  is  far  from necessary  or  justified  in  a  soceity  that 
respects the choices of its members.  The risk of infection, especially of HIV/AIDS is reason 
enough to campaign against the surgery.  The harm that comes from an unwanted surgery or a 
botched ceremony cannot be undone, and so violates a woman’s capability for physical, mental, 
and emotional health.  Parents who perform the procedure on their daughters cause this same 
irreparable damage; they will never be able to change the decision and will have to live with its 
consequences.  Of course, the less severe the surgery, the less serious the physical damage and 
the farther removed from a human rights abuse.
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For  this  reason,  the  comparison  to  male  circumcision  is  fallacious  and  dangerously 
misleading.  Only the most mild version of the practice is analogous to the removal of foreskin; 
an uninvasive, less bloody,  and overall less risky process that does not limit  or seek to limit 
sexual ability.  If male circumcision violates a capability, it is certainly less severe than most 
forms of female circumcision.  However, male circumcision is not performed in order to make 
men  more  marriageable.   Its  connection  to  historical  and  religious  tradition  has  been  less 
distorted  over  time  than  its  female  counterpart  and  men  do  not  circumcise  to  appear  more 
attractive to women.   As this  is an explicit  concern for many FGC procedures,  it  violates  a 
woman’s capability for sexual fulfillment and control over her life.  Furthermore, it  becomes 
farther  removed  from  any  historical  roots  in  eliminating  gender  ambivalence  and  becomes 
another method of patriarchal control.  A family’s desire to control their daughter’s sexuality is 
not inherently wrong, patriarchal, or subordinating.  Promoting birth control, abstinence, condom 
use,  or  other  non-invasive  and consensual  methods  of  limiting  sexuality  may well  protect  a 
child’s  future.   These  means  also  educate  young  women  about  the  consequences  of  sexual 
activity and encourage healthy ideas about sex.  Along a spectrum of techniques to protect one’s 
children  from  the  social,  economic,  and  physical  dangers  of  their  sexuality,  education, 
communication, abstinence, or even birth control, in more liberal contexts, would lie amongst the 
least potentially dangerous and limiting.  This surgery, by contrast, is nonconsensual, permanent, 
and  physically  severe:   it  denies  both  the  intent  of  the  capabilities  approach  and  physical 
wellness itself.
The claim that FGC is a necessary part of beauty or enhances male sexual pleasure is not 
foreign  to  Western  feminists.   Dieting,  eating  disorders,  or  questionably  safe  cosmetic 
procedures like Botox injections and pharmaceutical drugs occupy a similar place in feminist 
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discourse.   FGC  may  inspire  more  outrage  because  of  the  physical  actions  taken,  but  this 
motivation is ideological similar to the Western search for beauty.  As such, it can be addressed 
in human rights discourse in a similar way.  Action, so justified, is not taken to improve the lives 
of the women but rather to make them more appealing to men and is thus a form of masculine 
oppression.  Because there is a desire to make a woman more sexually appealing, cosmetic FGC 
perversely reinforces the idea that un-cut genitals are unattractive and that women should seek 
drastic  measures  to  sexually  please  their  male  partners.   Because  men  are  not  held  to  such 
standards of beauty this asymmetric practice places women in a position of inferiority, which is 
unacceptable in the capabilities framework.
The emotional and mental damage is far more difficult to quantify,  and any lasting or 
unwanted damage should be considered harmful.  The social gain is a pyrrhic victory because it 
forces women to submit to a procedure before they can participate in their social life.  Because 
the Koran is so ambivalent on the subject, FGC does not fulfill any real spiritual capability and 
claims to the contrary refer to a misogynist interpretation of religious texts.  Although many 
governments officially oppose the practice, male dominated communities keep it in place below 
the state level.  The testimonies of female refugees (Ali 2007, Kratz 2002), the potential physical 
harm to women, and the political consequences of rejecting genital cutting lead me to agree with 
a more universalist stance.
Nussbaum  explicitly  addresses  FGC  in  Sex  and  Social  Justice (1999)  in  a  chapter 
problematically titled ‘Judging Other Cultures’.  Nussbaum begins her discussion by arguing, as 
I have, that circumcision draws a fallacious comparison to male circumcision.  However I feel 
that she goes too far by claiming that the “male equivalent of the clitoridectomy would be the 
amputation of most of the penis [and] the male equivalent of infibulation would be removal of 
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the entire  penis,  its  roots of soft  tissue,  and part  of the scrotal  skin” (Nussbaum 1999:119), 
because  the  two  procedures  create  different  results  in  a  capabilities  framework.   While 
Nussbaum claims that FGC removes a woman’s capability for sexual functioning, ethnographies 
like Ellen Gruenbaum’s disagree (2001).  Nussbaum’s counter-argument would maintain that the 
women  in  question  did  not  have  a  reference  point  for  healthy  sexual  activity.   However, 
Gruenbaum has empirically tested this point in Sudan.  Voicing her concern that the women were 
unable to form a double consciousness that would allow them to see their own subjugation, the 
community thoroughly reassured her that they engaged in a fulfilling sex life.  At least for these 
women, FGC did not inhibit their capability for sexual fulfillment.  Nor does the process remove 
one’s ability to reproduce, as the removal of the penis would.  Through her comparison,  she 
actually does a disservice to those trying to  apply the capabilities  approach to human rights 
issues.  Her critique is not only misleading, it casts doubt on real testimonies of physical danger 
and abuse.  Ethnography is invaluable for dealing with an issue like FGC because it shows both 
the diversity of cases and the real dangers involved, including infection, painful intercourse, and 
emotional trauma.  Nussbaum’s argument becomes stronger as she draws on real experience, 
citing botched procedures and pleas for asylum.
The emphasis on physical damage also suggests that, if that danger could be minimized, 
the  practice  would  be  acceptable  for  human  rights  advocates.   For  example,  this  argument 
follows that if FGC were practiced in clean, well attended hospitals using anesthetic and parental 
consent forms (as most of the women who undergo FGC are legal minors), then it would offer no 
great threat to human rights.  As mentioned above, this was actually the case in 1950’s Europe 
and the United States.  The health concerns are serious and should give cause for alarm, but they 
do not address the more insidious means by which women’s rights are violated on the social-
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structure level.   We must  look past  physical  concerns  to  their  functioning,  what  women are 
actually capable of doing and being in communities that require the procedure.  In this case, the 
most important part of Nussbaum’s critique lies in her feminist approach.  FGC plays a part in 
perpetuating the dominance of men over women.   FGC limits  capabilities  by creating  a sex 
hierarchy in which men are superior to their female counterparts for no greater reason than their 
sex.  Because the women in question do not necessarily consent to the procedure, this major life 
choice lies largely with the men in their community.  The denial of personal agency and the lack 
of respect that creates it show that capabilities are being violated.  
After  weighing the evidence,  human rights advocates  can conclude that FGC has the 
potential to fulfill and deny capabilities.  But Nussbaum is absolutely clear that people must have 
control over their lives in order to access their potential.  In every situation, the people affected 
must have some kind of choice.  Because the only path to social life lies in this procedure, which 
is potentially dangerous and unabashedly patriarchal, these women have no alternative.  For this 
situation to fully satisfy the capabilities approach, there must be a way for women to respect their 
history and participate in their communities while still keeping their bodies, minds, and dignity 
intact.   Once  an  acceptable  alternative  has  been  found,  and  women  have  a  free  choice  for 
themselves and for their daughters, FGC may become obsolete.
The physical danger and social ramifications of FGC disproportionately affect women, 
and it would seem that the custom has its roots in male dominated culture.  The relativist would 
argue that these communities are best left discontinuing or continuing FGC as they see fit.  And 
certainly,  any  activist  that  would  fight  against  genital  cutting  would  also  risk  attacking  the 
cultural emphasis on family honor and purity that surrounds it.  But human rights activism does 
not have to involve an attack on culture.  By encouraging cross cultural dialog, human rights 
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organizations in North Africa and the West can work together, introducing a new perspective 
while preserving its cultural function.  The key for activists is a gradual and inclusive educational 
process.  A capabilities-based approach to the audience theory is especially effective because it 
correctly blames sexism on a political climate that allows discriminatory practices to hide behind 
cultural values of morality and community.  Equally important, the educational approach utilizes 
human rights ideology while still showing respect for culture.  Activists must recognize both the 
importance  of  familial  honor  and of  the  ceremonial  rite  of  passage.   Human rights  workers 
should always endeavor to maintain the cultural framework of the people they want to help, or 
else this human rights abuse will continue.  Without the full understanding and support of these 
people,  activists  seeking  to  end sexist  cultural  and political  practices  are  nothing  more  than 
imperialists or missionaries.
The Veil
In cultural politics, the veil is as much a symbol of Islam as the crescent moon and star. 
Women's  rights  organizations  throughout the world have criticized  the veil  as  exclusive and 
disempowering.   Several  nations  including  Turkey,  France,  Singapore,  Belgium Egypt,  and 
Germany  have  passed  laws  that  ban  the  traditional  headscarf,  as  well  as  other  more 
encompassing veils, in public settings (BBC News 2004, 2006).  Italy and the Netherlands are 
considering such laws, and British cabinet minister Jack Straw noted his discomfort in speaking 
with veiled women (BBC News 2006, Bilefsky and Fisher 2006).  Prominent Muslim scholars 
are split as well.  Muslim women continue to legislate for their right to veil in the West while 
scholars like Fadwa el Guindi (1998) argue for a more tolerant stance on the veil.  On the other 
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side, popular social critics like Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2007) and Nawal El Saadawi (1997) see veiling 
as a form of repressive and disenfranchising religious domination.  Like FGC, the veil has a 
complex history that has led to its perception today.
Although I will be speaking generally about 'the veil', the actual article is, of course, more 
nuanced.  Its homogeneity in law and in the international media is the result of both cultural 
politics and general ignorance as to the garment’s complexity.  There are several different types 
of head or body coverings, each reflecting a distinct regional, cultural, and religious tradition. 
The hijab is one of the most familiar to Western observers because it is a more liberal veil and is 
common in Western settings.  Literally a headscarf, it drapes over the head and neck but leaves 
the face clear.  The niqab is a more conservative garment that covers the entire body and leaves a 
slit for the eyes, masking shape and movement.  Common in strict Muslim communities, it is 
known as a burqa when worn with a sewn mesh that covers the eye slit.  This veil is common in 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Afghanistan (Ali 2007, El Guindi 1998).  The al-amira is similar to 
the hijab and includes a special fitted cap that covers the hair.  The shayla is also similar to the 
hijab and popular in the Gulf region.  A long scarf, it covers the hair, neck, and shoulders.  The 
khimar and chador both leave the face clear but are more like capes than headscarves.  Common 
in Southeast Asia and Iran, these cover the head and neck but extend past the shoulders (BBC 
2005).
Like FGC, the veil is a holdover from the jahiliyya, the time before Islam.  Veils were 
common throughout the pre-Islamic Middle East and North Africa for both men and women. 
Hardly a symbol of repression, the veil empowered some women by acting as a symbol of their 
high status.  El Guindi (1998) shows that in ancient Sumeria, the veil was a symbol of feminine 
power and domestic control while in Assyria veiling functioned as a symbol of class position, 
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where only upper class women were permitted to veil.  She continues, framing the exclusivity of 
the veil as a Western construction.  Whereas the Middle East and North African communities 
veiled to assert their societal role, Christian and Greek communities veiled as a symbol of gender 
hierarchy and deference  to  male  power.   In  the  early  Christian  context,  nuns  wore veils  to 
seclude themselves in abbeys and devote their lives to religion.  In doing so, they effectively 
removed themselves from the male dominated power structures.  However, in Arab societies 
where men and women veiled, the article did not develop as a means for gender segregation. 
Rather than impose patriarchal rule on women, early veiling reflected the existing class structure. 
Mohammed himself  veiled to show respect to other men and, by the dawn of Islam, men of 
various ethnic groups throughout the Middle East and North Africa veiled to show their class 
status, gain supernatural protection, and as part of ceremonial dress (El Guindi 1998).  Veiling 
reflected rather than caused or defined existing class hierarchy.  Socially speaking, the veil is not 
an issue itself so much as the inequality that it represents.
Islam adopted  the  veil  as  a  traditional  practice  and  offered  little  new  direction.   In 
mentioning the veil, the Qu'ran refers to the prophet's wives (Sura 33:53), covering one's breasts 
and  genitals,  (not  the  face)  (Sura  24:31)  and  distinguishing  between  'decent'  women  and 
prostitutes or slaves (Sura 33:59).  Because of this, most contemporary religious enforcement 
stems from tradition, the Hadith, and the Qu'ran (al-'Ashmawy 1998).  Contemporary writers 
(al-'Ashmawy 1998, Khan 1996, Jawad 1998) agree that the jahiliyya era society subjugated and 
sexualized women throughout the Middle East and North Africa.   However,  this subjugation 
occurred  without  the  use  of  the  veil.   The  veil  symbolized  a  new  and  progressive  gender 
dynamic, designed to protect women’s dignity.
Mohammed's reforms were thus motivated to protect women's rights, including property, 
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safety,  and  modesty.   While  some  critics  (Ali  2007)  argue  that  veiling  reflects  a  religious 
obsession with purity,  others (El  Guindi  1998) note  that  purity and impurity  are fluid states 
within an Islamic context.  Islam, unlike Christianity or Judaism, defines equality in its Genesis 
story.   Early Islamic thought and law protected the right of property and money,  the right to 
marry willingly and divorce at will, the right to education, the right to her family name, the right 
to sexual pleasure, the right to inheritance, the right of election, nomination, and participation in 
the political realm, and the right to respect (Jawad 1998).  Modern Islamist laws that prevent 
education, divorce, or political interaction are only sexist interpretations that keep the elite in 
power, as will be discussed further.  The veil served as another method of protection and Islamic 
distinction  from the other  communities  in  the Middle East.   Just  as  a  yarmulke  or  crucifix, 
Western observers should view Islamic veiling as a religious article when outside of its regional 
context.   Extending the metaphor,  to fully respect a capabilities  approach to human rights, a 
liberal and contextual interpretation of the Qu'ran shows that women should have the option to 
veil or not veil as they see fit (al-'Ashmawy 1998).  If a woman believes that veiling or not 
veiling  will  help  her  fulfill  a  religious  or  personal  potential,  then  the  capabilities  approach 
mandates  that  human  rights  activists  and  local  laws allow her  do to  so.   Both denying and 
requiring it negate a woman's autonomy.
For a time, Muslim women enjoyed far more freedom than their counterparts in the West 
as a result of Mohammed's reforms.  Unfortunately, infighting and power struggles within the 
religious  and political  circles  ended any legal  reform.   As authoritarian  leaders attempted to 
consolidate  power,  reform  became  tantamount  to  treason  and  conservative  interpretations 
prevailed over more fluid social rules (Khan 1996, Moussalli 2001).  Out of a contemporary 
necessity, the Hadith, Qu'ran, and focus on female rather than male veiling, but that intended 
53
protection  transformed  into  disenfranchisement  as  Caliphs,  Imams,  and  hereditary  rulers 
attempted  to  gain  political  power.   Thus,  the  veil,  a  newly  religious  symbol  of  propriety, 
modesty, and Muslim civilization, did not continue to protect women's rights.  Instead, with sole 
religious and political authority vested in a few, male, leaders, legal interpretation stagnated and 
conservatives presented their own sexist view as truth (Monshipouri 1999).  Rather than allow 
women to continue observing equality,  the veil was newly interpreted as a system of control 
(Jawad 1998).  In the 1960's, Islamism, following writings of Qutb, Maududi, and Khomeini, 
would draw upon these fabricated ideas to disenfranchise women (El Guindi 1998), presenting 
this narrow construction as a truth that gave men dominance over women.
In the colonial era, European powers alternately banned traditional practices and dress or 
allowed them to continue, depending on the effect on regional stability (Said 1994, al-'Ashmawy 
1998, El Guindi 1998).  When the veil allowed free expression of Muslim faith, colonial powers 
prohibited it in the name of modernization; when it kept women out of the political spectrum, 
they allowed it.  The postcolonial era witnessed a resurgence of Muslim pride, conflated with 
nationalist identity.  In many modern Muslim countries, to veil is to express cultural pride.  This 
is  especially  true in Algeria,  where Muslim women used the veil  to  defy French colonialist 
influence.  Denied full expression of their religious and cultural heritage, Algerian women chose 
to veil to symbolize their independence. Young women began wearing the veil in Egypt in the 
1970's, and the movement has since spread to many other countries and Muslim communities. 
Palestinians, denied their right to self-determination, veil to show national solidarity and instill a 
symbolic unity despite their lack of a national identity. Many women veil as a gesture of respect 
to Islam itself that “rejects Western materialism, consumerism, commercialism, and values” (El 
Guindi 1998:145).  Dress embodies a socio-moral code, a self assertion of a woman capable, 
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intelligent, and distinctly Muslim.  Veiling also gives women a way to participate in the work 
and market environments without having to sacrifice values of modesty and purity.
El Guindi argues that the veil becomes an instrument of repression when it begins to 
symbolize seclusion, silence, and anonymity,  a point shared by the capabilities critique.  As a 
result  of  the  postcolonial  power  vacuums  in  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa,  some 
communities  have  forced  the  veil  upon  their  women.   By  following  extremist  leaders  who 
offered  a  return  to  tradition  and  prosperity  after  years  of  colonial  imposition  and  poverty, 
Muslim communities effectively ignored the vast potential for women's rights as established in 
the Hadith and Qu'ran.  The Taliban in Afghanistan implemented such a strict Islamic rule to 
validate their authoritarian rule (Kepel 2002, Mayer 1998, Monshipouri 1998, Dorraj 1999).  By 
the  same  token,  Saudi  'religious'  laws prevent  women from making a  serious  impact  in  the 
political  sphere,  as  evidenced  when  Saudi  Arabia's  highest  religious  authority  condemned 
women  who  advocated,  unveiled,  economic  reforms.   Ignoring  their  policy  suggestion,  he 
warned of  “grave consequences”  due to  their  “outrageous  behavior”  (BBC 2004).   Keeping 
women under the veil ensured that the regime would face no political or economic opposition 
from the female population.  Just as they opposed the Western influence that restricted the veil, 
Muslim feminists oppose the mandatory measures.  In such instances, it is a tool of class and 
gender segregation wielded by politically powerful men.  Ironically, this tradition is less Islamic 
than Western.  
The Hellenic gender ideology that would come to define Western thought maintained that 
women should be segregated from men, practicing silence and submission.  Christianity took this 
idea  and  expanded  it  to  the  Catholic  convent.  Nuns  veiled  to  symbolize  their  chastity  and 
separation from greater society.   When Western nations colonized the Middle East and North 
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Africa, they extended this view to a culture that seemed exotic and sexual.  Through this lens, 
they came to see the veil as an extension of the harem (El Guindi 1998).  Colonizers glorified 
this false perception with pictures of exposed, veiled women and “ethnographic” accounts that 
promised visitors sexuality and immorality.  However, this cultural explanation is an imposition.
The veil is a complex symbol in the Middle East and North Africa.  On one level, it 
symbolizes Muslim, Arab, or African identity as a tangible expression of regional identity.  This 
level is especially important when examined as a response to historical and ongoing bans.  The 
current  body  covering  limitations  in  Europe  provide  legitimacy  to  those  regimes  that  force 
women to veil.  Aided by the false East-West dichotomy, authoritarian rulers draw a contrast 
between their own states and the repressive Western nations that legally target Muslim tradition.
On another level, the veil symbolizes a compliance with religious tradition.  Veiling is 
mentioned and advised, under certain situations and for certain people, in the Hadith, and Qu'ran 
(Khan 1996).  Western observers, drawing upon a secular tradition and their own ethnocentrism, 
have  a  tendency  to  confuse  religious  devotion  with  oppression.   Linguistically,  the  Arabic 
language connects women, religion, family, and community through a common root (El Guindi 
1998) and women who chose to do so have every right to maintain that bond in their daily life. 
Western observers should remember that empowerment can come from family and religion, not 
just success within the capitalist system.  Modesty, privacy, respect, and commitment to family 
are not intrinsically disenfranchising tenets of Islam.  Unfortunately, they are easily manipulated 
in a patriarchal system, but we should be careful not to confuse male domination with inflexible, 
divine instruction.  In instances where a woman has the option and remains capable of fulfilling 
her desired potential,  we cannot argue that a human rights violation is taking place.  Women 
receive the honor of wearing a special veil upon completion of the hajj, often the final pillar of 
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Islam undertaken (El Guindi 1998).  Like the Jewish tallit or a military officer's decorations, this 
veil connotes their new and higher status of hajja within the community; naming the hajja's veil a 
human rights violation represents a gross misunderstanding.
Unlike the puritan philosophy that  characterized  the colonizing  Christian West,  Islam 
recognized sexuality and attempted to incorporate it into the Muslim way of life (El Guindi 1998, 
2006, Jawad 1998).  As a result, the colonizers saw the Middle East and North Africa as a hotbed 
of passion and sexuality.  They incorporated harems, prostitutes, and sexual openness into the 
greater oriental framework (Said 1994) that placed the enlightened West in a superior position. 
El Guindi (1998) argues that part of the reason that the veil remains so unpalatable for Western 
feminists  and human rights advocates is this  lasting perception of imposed sexuality and the 
lasting Christian conceptualization of sex as dirty and shameful.  If the veil were merely a tool 
for sexual subordination, then outside observers could be justifiably concerned.  However, the 
veil is more culturally established as an indicator of status and social rank.
Dress,  like  the  male  and  female  genital  cutting  discussed  previously,  indicates 
membership within a collective identity.  This can be communal, ethnic, religious, regional, or 
any combination depending on an individual's intent.  Clothing reflects status in the Middle East 
and North Africa  as it  does across  cultures.   Ceremonial  dress will  obviously carry cultural 
weight, but ordinary clothes indicate an equal variety of significant values.  This is certainly 
present in Western society:   business professionals wear suits to convey their professionalism 
and competence;  fashion magazines  have made their  fortunes  on symbolic  interpretations  of 
clothing accessories; popular stores like Hot Topic mass produce 'counter-culture' for teenage 
consumption;  many restaurants  maintain  dress  codes  that,  along with their  expense,  exclude 
lower  socioeconomic  classes.   Visual  expressions  of  class  superiority  are  evident  in  many 
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societies, including American and North African communities, but the veil can have a secondary, 
disempowering purpose.
Fadwa El Guindi's 1998 book Veil:  Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance shows that, as with 
any  of  those  Western  examples,  Middle  East  and  North  African  veiling  has  traditionally 
indicated one's class status.  Clothing facilitates the complex social interactions between men 
women, and members of different political, social, or economic classes.  High ranking women 
veil not to protect their dignity from wandering eyes, but to command respect and symbolize 
inaccessibility.   In this context, a veiled woman uses clothing to symbolize her superiority to 
others, including men.  Women may choose not to veil to people whom they do not need to show 
respect.  Additionally, in many communities, adult women veil while girls do not.  Thus the veil 
connotes  maturity  and  responsibility.   It  immediately  identifies  a  woman  as  a  contributing 
member of the community, indicating one’s passage into adulthood.    This status recognition is 
not confined to women.  In some communities, like the Tuareg of Saharan Africa, the men veil 
instead of women and in others, like the Berbers in North Africa or students and teachers at 
Muslim universities, both sexes veil.  While showing status in stratified society,  the veil also 
symbolizes  a  connection  to  the  past.   Veiling  shows  respect  for  one's  history  and  family, 
providing a tangible link to culture and tradition in a quickly globalizing world.  Reducing the 
veil  to  a  symbol  of  sexuality  alone  ignores  complex  power  structure  that  facilitates  and 
perpetuates  the  orientalist  notion  that  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  are  dominated  by 
sexuality and lack reason or complexity.  Veiling predated Islam, Christianity, or Judaism and its 
main  cultural  function,  visually  reflecting  the  existing  power  hierarchy,  has  remained  intact 
through iterations in each religion.  Neither the religious nor cultural meanings surrounding the 
veil are designed to disempower women or limit their capability to function outside the home or 
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family contexts.
Recognizing their own historical oppression in other contexts, Western women's rights 
groups have turned to the Middle East and North Africa,  each spreading their  own brand of 
feminism.  When this takes the form of cross-cultural dialog, sharing ideas in equal discussion, 
both Western feminists and the women they seek to help benefit.  But rights lists, government 
mandates,  or  economic  growth  scenarios  miss  the  nuances  that  arise  during  cooperative 
discussions.  Economic rights schemes that focus on national income or personal utility will be 
totally ineffective when dealing with the veil.  The human rights issues that arise from veiling are 
issues of access, not of resource scarcity.  A common feminist argument holds that politically 
powerful men use veiling as tool to prevent women from leaving the home, conducting business, 
or attaining an equal political status.  In some parts of the world, veiling does serve this purpose 
and ignores much of the article’s cultural significance.  In other situations, traditional women's 
rights discourse assumes superiority and advocates change from above rather than from within 
regional context.  Male-dominated families may force wives and daughters to veil in an attempt 
to hinder their social advancement.  Other women may veil to pay homage to a religious and 
cultural institution almost fourteen-hundred years old.  To accuse these women of having a false 
consciousness is not only ethnocentric  but also ignorant.   Cultural  relativism is an important 
concept to keep in mind for anthropological activists; veiling cannot be universally judged.
Imposing orientalist  sexuality and Western seclusion on the veil,  feminist  and human 
rights  discourse has  come to  see it  as  an abuse (El  Guindi  1998).   This  false  perception  is 
exacerbated  by  authoritarian  regimes  that  follow  a  sexist  interpretation  of  Islam  and  have 
publicly defined culture within sexist parameters.  Those regimes that legally force women to 
veil  remove their  capability  to  fulfill  their  potential,  thus  committing  a human rights abuse. 
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Consequences for unveiled women in such regimes can be severe, including beatings, religious 
stigmatization, or even death (Meek 2001).  These draconian measures, imposed to keep women 
safely  removed  from political  action,  cause  Western  observers  to  perceive  veiling  itself  as 
incompatible with human rights.
Veiling bans have created an opposite reaction throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa.  Religious scholars, authoritarians, and liberal women have all condemned the bans in 
Europe and Turkey as persecution or neo-imperialism (Kepel 2002, Sadaawi 1997, An-Na'im 
2008).  This criticism is entirely justified because a blanket ban denies the capability for religious 
expression and cultural fulfillment and thus denies human rights.  Furthermore, this legal action 
ignores  any  autonomous  religious  desire  for  modesty,  privacy,  and  family  commitment  or 
cultural connection to family and regional tradition.  Unfairly criticized by human rights groups 
as solely exclusionary and imposed on unwilling women as a symbol of national or religious 
resistance, the veil has been appropriated as political leverage.  Because it is so visual and easily 
recognizable as Middle Eastern and North African, the veil has entered the realm of cultural 
politics for both tyrants and human rights advocates.
Although women like Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2007) and Nawal el Saadawi (1997) have joined 
Western feminists in condemning veiling as exclusionary, many women in the Middle East and 
North Africa insist on veiling despite acknowledging ongoing and future possible violations (El 
Guindi  1998,  Bhutto  2008).   I  have  discussed  the  nationalist  and  identity  motivations  for 
claiming the veil,  but women also cite  socioeconomic forces.   Within states governed under 
Islamist rule, women must veil in order to advance within their work and social structures (El 
Guindi 1998).  Saudi Arabia, for example, requires women to veil when employed (Whitaker 
2006).   If  a  woman  wants  to  work  or  advance  in  her  workplace,  she  must  agree  to  this 
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requirement.  Here, it is a tool of empowerment that allows a woman to exercise her economic 
capabilities.  While feminism argues that this rule reinforces institutional patriarchy, women see 
it, at worst, as a necessary evil to work within the system.  This differs from requirements of 
FGC in that FGC is more permanent, less empowering, and most importantly, veiling at work is 
a daily choice made by the woman.  From another perspective, if a woman wishes to work but 
also exercise a religious pride in privacy or display her connection to a deep cultural heritage, the 
veil allows her to do so without compromising these desires.  In veiling communities, refusal to 
veil can negate the social status conferred by that garment and invite criticism, directed at both 
the woman herself and her family.  Thus, women choose to veil and retain good social standing 
within such communities (El Guindi 1998).  In doing so, they uphold ethnic or regional moral 
and visual identity.  This may seem to be an imposition, but any critics should keep in mind that 
all societies have certain clothing restrictions.  Americans cannot wear tie-dye, cloaks, or simply 
walk around naked, for example, without inviting general critique or police action.  
Veiling as a Human Capability
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach can navigate the cultural politics that surround the veil, 
mediating feminist, religious, traditional, social, political, and economic arguments.  Once again, 
the focus must shift from the individual’s  relationship with her government to the individual 
ability to fulfill central capabilities.  Anthropologists should endeavor to protect the capability to 
veil along with its counterpart, the capability to unveil.  In practice, veiling is integrally related to 
the baseline capabilities of bodily integrity, free affiliation, and control over one’s environment. 
In some situations, the act of unveiling can be grounds for social stigma or even physical assault 
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(Monshipouri 1998, Bhat and Hussain 2007).  In this case, choice is removed and veil becomes a 
segregating symbol that reinforces patriarchal violence.  Women are not allowed to live to their 
full potential and, due to threats of violence, must defer to the male authority that subjugates 
their action through the veil.  Such action reflects the greater threat of violence against women 
who would challenge male authority.  The most that they can do or be, in capabilities terms, is 
the disenfranchised women that men desire them to be.
On the other end of the spectrum, France and Turkey remove the capability for free social 
and religious affiliation by banning the article.  Women who veil in these countries now do so to 
show their defiant pride for their cultural and religious heritage.  Veiling prevents women from 
securing  employment  and reinforces  the  orientalist  notion  of  the  Arab  other,  as  depicted  in 
current cultural politics.  Even by the standards of Western-oriented contractual rights with one’s 
government,  this  action  violates  the  freedom  of  religious  expression.   From  a  capabilities 
perspective, veiling bans challenge the inherent dignity of Muslim women and the respect owed 
to them as human beings.  Worse, because such bans apply indiscriminately,  they ignore the 
culturally specific environment in which women choose to veil.  The capabilities approach is 
especially  critical  of  simple  or  all-encompassing  human  rights  schemes:   this  is  a  plea  for 
difficulty.   Criminalizing the veil  institutionalizes the idea that the veil is harmful.   As with 
situations where veiling is mandatory, it creates an environment in which Muslim women are 
afraid to consciously and thoughtfully express their religious and cultural worldviews through 
the  veil.   Women  forbidden  from  veiling  are  not  allowed  to  be  religiously  and  culturally 
observant, and are thus denied the full range of their capabilities.  
 Most importantly, veiling bans and directives both take choice away from women and 
place it into the hands of political authorities.  Women are forbidden from coming to culturally 
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informed decisions about their own dress decisions.  Any attempts to assert free choice in this 
matter lead women to be publically humiliated, discriminated against, and even endangered.  In 
such an environment, how can women fully realize their potential?  When the veil is outlawed, 
some women may find themselves unable to be Muslims.  When the veil is enforced, women 
may be unable to assert themselves publically, whether by conducting business, holding public 
office, or even fulfilling a social life outside of the home.  By examining this issue through a 
capabilities lens, anthropologists can consider the enormous cultural weight that constructs the 
veil.  This should not be done in opposition to family wishes; after all the family has the same 
communal rights to dignity and respect as individuals.  Anthropologists are well equipped to 
work with veiling proponents or opponents to find a culturally satisfying solution that will enable 
women to lead full lives without seriously compromising the family’s religious and social values. 
More so than typical human rights issues like prison conditions or sex trafficking, veiling falls 
into a gray category that can entail abuse but also fully aware religious expression.  Universal 
rights contracts miss the distinction while a culturally relative ‘hands-off’ position would ignore 
the dangerous ramifications of forced veiling.  Economic development measures like income or 
GNP are entirely ill-equipped to deal with veiling as a human rights issue.  To gage the function 
and meaning behind specific situations, anthropologists must evaluate the freedom of capabilities 
and treat each potential abuse on a case-by-case basis.  
In reconciling perceived or actual human rights abuses stemming from the veil, human 
rights advocates must first better understand the article itself.  This requires real dialog between 
human rights advocates, feminists, and women living in the Middle East and North Africa.  In 
examining a possible abuse, the case should be reviewed by etic and emic observers to ensure 
legitimacy and pluralist input.  Blanket bans that ignore cultural and religious rights are not only 
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ineffective but also counterproductive.  Similarly any, education programs designed to empower 
women by removing their  veils  merely insult  their  heritage by falsely imposing  orientalism-
inspired notions of sexuality and seclusion.  Such programs claim an ethnocentric superiority by 
assuming that  Western  concepts  of modesty,  privacy,  and family are  superior  and therefore, 
women  claim  the  veil  out  of  ignorance.   This  view is  extended  to  the  anti-veiling  laws  in 
countries as diverse as France and Turkey.  The capabilities approach can enable human rights 
advocates  to  differentiate  between  an  expression  of  culture  and  religion  and  an  external 
imposition.   Such impositions  can take the form of restricting  or requiring the veil  entirely: 
neither allows for autonomy and both limit the possibility of a pluralist society.  The veil itself is 
not abuse, but its appropriation in cultural  politics,  by Islamist  conservatives or over-zealous 
rights groups, often is.   
Democracy
Veiling and FGC are both relatively tangible cultural constructions.  However, the idea of 
democracy exists only conceptually.   The right to popular and equal political  participation is 
guaranteed  by  article  twenty-one  of  the  Universal  Declaration,  but  prominent  scholars  like 
Sayyid Abdul Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, and Ruhollah Khomeini have produced works arguing 
that  such  a  system is  incompatible  with  Islam (Khatab  and  Bouma  2007,  Moussalli  2001). 
Conservative Westerners like journalist Daniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington, have forwarded the 
idea that the Islam and the West are bound for conflict, and the popular media seem to agree 
(Monshipouri 1997, Halliday 1996, Gerges 1999, Dorraj 1999).  In asserting their political power 
on the world stage, authoritarian rulers in Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and many other 
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states in the Middle East and North Africa have refused to hold elections and grant equal civil 
rights,  citing  an incompatibility  between pluralist  democracy and Islam (Kepel  2002, Dorraj 
1999).  Yet a growing number of scholars, including Abdullah An-Na'im, Benazir Bhutto, Fred 
Halliday, and Ahmad S. Moussalli argue that democracy and Islam are not only compatible but 
also fundamentally interrelated.  In undertaking a liberal approach to both Islam and democracy, 
we can fully expose the fallacious conflict  between 'Eastern' and 'Western'  values in cultural 
politics through cross-cultural dialog.
Due to my own saturation with confrontational rhetoric in the media and popular politics, 
I was surprised to learn that Shari'a can be a force for democracy.  These ideas exist within the 
concepts of shura and ijma.  The shura refers to a consultation involved in legislation and legal 
interpretation.  This is the very essence of democracy.  Developed in an age of monarchs and 
dictators, it was the most inclusive governing system of its time (Moussalli 2001).  The early 
Muslim scholars even improved on the original  Greek design,  including women in the legal 
drafting bodies (Jawad 1998).  Here again, one observes that liberal Muslim demands for gender 
equality are at least as culturally and religiously valid as the current disenfranchisement, and 
more historically accurate.  The shura also contains provisions designed to depose an illegitimate 
leader.  A leader who denies consultation is thus a tyrant and tyrants have no authority according 
to the shura (Moussalli 2001).  By this rule, there can be no truly Islamic government without 
popular input and authoritarian regimes are illegitimate.   Determined by the people whom it 
affects,  this legal philosophy has the potential  to form the core of modern democratic Islam. 
More importantly it proves that the construction of democracy, of legislation and government as 
powers vested in the community rather than an individual, has an Islamic and Arab base.  Far 
from a  cultural  imposition,  Muslims  valued  democracy  at  a  time  when the  nation-states  of 
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Europe were still warring tribes, fighting over the remnants of the Roman empire.
The  ijma refers to a consensus required before legal  and executive direction can take 
place.  While the shura provides the discussion necessary for democracy, the ijma necessitates 
that they should agree before acting (Moussalli 2001).  What is this if not a code for majority 
rule and a channel for compromise?  Conceptually, in a society where the shura is comprised of 
men and women of various creeds, colors, and religions, the ijma provides an Islamic direction 
for pluralist  democracy.   Democracy is neither a foreign concept nor the newest iteration of 
colonial domination.  The notion that democracy and Islam are philosophically incompatible is 
thus untrue.  By its very definition, democracy is communal consensus and is ijma.  This is not to 
say that American or European democratic systems are well suited for the Middle East and North 
Africa.  Bicameral legislatures, parliaments, ministers, and presidents are all products of their 
own historical development and any such system in the region would have to develop within its 
own  context.   But  the  shura and  ijma outline  a  legitimate,  Islamic  base  from  which  an 
appropriate democratic government can emerge.  The idea itself is firmly established in Islamic 
jurisprudence.  In this light, it is difficult to see why Western, Middle Eastern, and North African 
leaders  maintain  that  Islam  and  democracy  are  incompatible  in  cultural  politics.   To  fully 
understand this issue, we must return to 632 C.E., Mohammed’s death.
To understate, Mohammed's impact on the Arab world during his lifetime was profound. 
Religion aside, Mohammed united warring tribes and established the first Arab polity, one based 
not  on ethnicity  or  family  affiliation  but  on  mutual  respect  and  a  shared  belief  system that 
included not only religion but morality, philosophy, and pluralistic peace (Moussalli 2001).  This 
state included not only the concepts of the democracy embodied in the shura and ijma, but also 
social  contract,  constitutionalism, freedom of religion,  and individual rights.  But before this 
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system, with the potential for pluralism, democracy, liberalism, and moral guidance could fully 
develop, Mohammed fell ill and died.  
His authority “was unique and cannot be replicated, because Muslims do not accept the 
possibility of prophets after the Prophet Mohammed” (An-Na'im 2008:53).  The state's future 
suddenly fell to the far less capable hands of humans lacking divine inspiration.  Mohammed's 
death created a power vacuum and each successive ruler who attempted to claim the right to lead 
faced rebel factions.  The line of descent is so contentious that the Shia and Sunni Muslims 
remain split, primarily over disagreements regarding Mohammed's succession.  The early caliphs 
and political  leaders  disagreed  over  the  Qu’ran and Hadith,  attracting  supporters  as  well  as 
enemies.  As each faction developed the Shari'a, the successive leaders or rebel factions defined 
their rule as absolutely correct and their enemies as absolutely wrong.  This environment led to 
the  wars  of  apostasy  that  followed  the  Prophet's  death  (An-Na'im  2008).   Apostasy,  the 
renouncement of faith, was leveled at political opponents to discredit their power and religiously 
justify their murder.  Interestingly, this same technique would be used seven hundred years later 
in Medieval Europe by Catholic states who accused the Central European Hussites of heresy, and 
then repeatedly to justify violent  conflicts  well  into the nineteenth  century.   By labeling  his 
enemies as apostates, Abu Bakr, the first caliph, legitimized his own political rule.
However, this alone does not explain the conservative interpretations championed by the 
most vocal and repressive rulers in the Middle East and North Africa, nor does it justify the 
absence  of  democratic  process  in  the  region.   None  of  the  leaders  immediately  following 
Mohammed  wielded  sufficient  political  power  or  authority  to  confidently  rule  without 
challenges,  nor  did  they  hold  power  long  enough  to  feel  comfortable  exercising  their  rule 
liberally.  They followed Bakr’s example in an attempt to consolidate authority, but in doing so, 
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sacrificed any institutional liberalization.  Pluralism and tolerance were cast aside in favor of 
greater  control.   Successive  caliphs  and tribal  leaders  would  suppress  any legal  or  religious 
interpretations  that  challenged  their  rule,  eventually  eliminating  six  of  the  seven  Qu'ranic 
readings  that  the  Prophet  himself  authorized  (Moussalli  2001).   By  appointing  politically 
supportive jurists and religious supporters, political elites maintained control over religious and 
political interpretation, revoking the rights of ijma and shura from the community.
This  time  witnessed  the  passage  of  many disenfranchising  laws and legal  precedents 
against women and other religious minorities (Bhutto 2008).  By decreasing their political and 
economic  freedom,  those  in  power  limited  their  potential  opponents  to  members  of  the 
community with similar philosophical ideas and socioeconomic standing.  Drawing on their legal 
and religious  authority,  those in power were able  to  systematically reduce potential  political 
threats to those who wielded socioeconomic power.  That is, they were able to consolidate the 
tools for political and social change in the hands of those who had no desire to see the status quo 
altered.  Corrupt leaders paid off well-connected political dissidents while ignoring those that 
posed no potential threat, using hereditary treasuries as their personal banks (Khatab and Bouma 
2007).  Some factions disagreed with this alteration and multiple factions broke into civil war, 
accusing each other of kufr, or absolute unbelief.  Interestingly, this is the climate in which the 
laws condemning apostates to death emerged.   In this context, an apostate is less a religious 
heretic  than  a  political  dissident  (Moussalli  2001,  An-Na'im  2008).   As  Muslim  influence 
expanded  into  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  rulers  made  liberal  cultural  concessions  and 
conservative political  judgments.   In affirming their  rule,  politicians  and religious authorities 
worked  together  to  maintain  their  own  legitimacy  while  condemning  political  enemies  as 
apostates.  They based their state primarily on the claim that their rule alone represented God’s 
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will.  This claim of infallibility gave the elite “a free hand, full power and absolute authority over 
the people, the national income, and destiny of the nation.  In domestic affairs, the people were 
almost always (with few exceptions) treated as members of a herd rather than as citizens; as 
subjects rather than brothers in Islam” (al-'Ashmawy 1999:76).  This is a clear appropriation of a 
religion that instructs that all are equal before God.
By the colonial era, religion and politics had both become so interrelated that the two 
authorities were inseparable.  In the race to maintain power, religious rule had become political 
rule.   Unfortunately,  Mohammed  alone  had  the  popular  authority  to  combine  religion  and 
politics.  In addition to denying  shura and  ijma, authoritarian leaders also denied the right of 
ijihad, interpretation of the Qu'ran.  Muslim leaders from Andalusia to the Mughal and Ottoman 
empires denied the right of printing for three hundred years after its invention, a tactic used by 
the Christian world to limit independent thought (Bhutto 2008).  By suppressing knowledge and 
interpretation, religious and political leaders worked together to ensure that only their narrow 
views on human rights, religion, and politics advanced.  Over time, their opinions came to be 
accepted  as  the  truth,  and  authoritarian  leaders  today  look  to  these  false  constructions  to 
legitimize their own rule.  In her memoir, Ayaan Ali describes (2007) her religious instruction as 
memorization rather than education.  When she questions her teacher's interpretation, she is met 
with dismissal, hostility, and even violence.  This perpetuation of ignorance and dogma stifles 
creative thought and denies political change.
Western colonialism appeared at the height of this fragmentation and repression.  In the 
name of stability, European colonizers allowed cultural and political practices, like authoritarian 
rule and segregative veiling,  to continue (Said 1994).  In fact, the West continues to support 
repressive regimes in exchange for oil or regional stability, as a number of authors argue (Gerges 
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1999,  Saadawi  1997,  Chomsky  2003).   Ignorance,  poor  education,  systematic 
disenfranchisement  all  fit  that  bill.   However,  democracy  and  Islamic  education  were 
systematically discontinued because they threatened to upset the balance of power in favor of the 
colonized.   In  such  progressive  instances,  the  West  disrupted  any stability  and deposed  the 
former  political  authorities.   In their  place,  the colonizers  artificially  created  nation-states,  a 
system that  revived  ancient  ethnic  struggles  placated  by Mohammed's  early  pluralist  society 
(Sahliyeh  2003).   By  the  twentieth  century,  postcolonial  resentment  led  prominent  Muslim 
scholars to reject  democracy along with several  other Western philosophies that  had plagued 
them for  centuries.   While  a  minority  of  these  scholars  argued  that  Muslims  should  reject 
imposed national  borders and capitalism,  the most  influential  voices chose to  embrace those 
ideas  because they provided  economic  security  and political  power.   Although a  number  of 
reformers traveled in Europe and America, advocating a moderate approach that would preserve 
liberal  democracy  and trim away geopolitical  dominance,  their  writing  did  not  emerge  as  a 
dominant discourse (Khatab and Bouma 2007).  
By the time of Sayyid Qutb's execution in 1966 the Islamism movement had come to 
firmly reject  Western democracy as  an extension  of  the immorality  and decadence  that  had 
spiritually destroyed EuorAmerican civilization.  Ironically, this systematic rejection effectively 
reversed  Mohammed's  own directives  in  favor  of  a  corrupt  and  rewritten  history.   Despite 
accepting  market  economies  and  industrialized  society,  Islamists  justified  their  rejection  by 
claiming  that  democratic  rule  was  a  foreign,  imperialist  concept  (An-Na'im  2008).   That 
authoritarian rulers did not choose to reject Western currency, language, or international borders 
suggests that anti-democratic regimes result from more than 'culture clash'.  Khomeini, Qutb, and 
Maududi came to believe that only an Islamic state firmly grounded in a particular version of 
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both  Shari'a and Islamic tradition would suffice for the Muslim world (Moussalli 2001).  But 
these men did not question the interpretations that they presented as the truth.  Their rejection of 
popular rule was influenced so completely by corrupt Western rule that they turned to the only 
remaining source of legitimacy in their world:  religion. Yet, as Moussalli (2001), al-'Ashmawy 
(1999)  and  An-Na'im (2008)  argue,  a  theocracy  is,  by  definition,  un-Islamic.   A theocracy 
demands  that  divine  instruction  be  received  and  transmitted  through  a  human  executive  or 
executives.  By definition, theocracies require prophets, and Islam declares that Mohammad was 
the final prophet.  Any contemporary ruler claiming divine inspiration acts against this belief, 
both disobeying the Qu'ran and breaking  Shari'a.   When examining the ways that Islam has 
developed historically  and regionally,  it  is  important  to  recognize that  for capabilities  work, 
which focuses on real lives and actions, the most relevant religion is that which affects the lives 
of the people in question.  History simply shows how many different forces have shaped that 
religion.
However, if we wish to use Islam as a guiding philosophy for government then, as An-
Na'im (1996,  2008)  and Bhutto  (2008)  suggest,  we should  turn  to  Mohammed's  words  and 
direction, not those of his warring successors.  That is, we should turn to pluralist democracy, 
defined by the Prophet over a thousand years before acknowledged by the American constitution. 
Rather than claim a dichotomy between Shari'a and democratically designed law, as this Islamist 
discourse suggests, democratic reformers should keep Shari’a's interpreted history in mind.  The 
laws  grew out  of  a  conservative  tradition  and their  human  origins  give  modern  liberals  the 
authority to advocate change.
Shari’a law  was  developed  after  political  and  religious  authorities  had  restricted 
interpretation and during the continual power struggles (Bhutto 2008, An-Na'im 1996).  Its scope 
71
is thus defined by the jurists who claimed power.  Although Shari’a was originally intended to 
govern  prevent  individuals  and  rulers  from gaining  too  much  power,  internal  influence  and 
colonial  rule  caused  it  to  take  on a  more  conservative  tone.   Under  pressure  from political 
enemies,  Shari’a granted the authorities increasing control while its family and personal laws 
grew more restrictive (Bhutto 2008, 1996).  Ali Benhaj, Khomeini, Qutb, and Maududi's work in 
the postcolonial era accepts these restrictive interpretations as the truth and presents democracy 
as kufr (Tibi 1998).   Modern authoritarian states, in turn, draw upon these philosophers and use 
their  work  to  justify  human  rights  abuses  and  democratic  disenfranchisement  (Kepel  2002, 
Dorraj 1998).  In the newest iteration of interpretive control, they present Shari’a as immutable 
and severe.
But  Shari’a has  a  history  of  adapting  to  popular  need  or  desires,  whether  social, 
technological,  or  economic  (Chase  2006).   The  vast  complexity  of  Shari’a,  as  with  Jewish 
religious law and the texts of all three Abrahamic religions, lends itself to ambiguity.  Because it 
lacks  legal  consistency,  it  must  be  regularly  reevaluated  to  maintain  clarity  and  relevance 
(Mayer  1998,  Tibi  1998).   Even under  the  most  conservative  approach,  Shari’a,  unlike  the 
Qu'ran, can be liberally interpreted and contextualized because it is man-made and relates to 
man's  relationship  with  others,  not  with  his  relationship  with  God.   Shari’a law  is  thus 
amendable and can adapt to serve a purpose in the modern context (An-Na'im 1996, 2008).  As 
Zehra  F.  Kabasakal  Arat  (2003)  reminds  us,  the  idea  of  a  stable  and  defined  Shari’a is  a 
misconception itself.  Subject to a regime's interpretations of the Hadith, Sunna, and Qu'ran and 
even the jurisprudence of the Shari’a itself, Islamic law is far from homogeneous.  Indeed, it has 
a strong tradition of individual interpretation (Dallacoura 1998), aided by a religious imperative 
to  seek  out  knowledge,  fight  tyranny,  and  help  those  in  need.   Thus,  the  perceived 
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incompatibility between Islam and democracy is neither cultural, religious, nor even legitimately 
legal.   Drawing  on  a  long history  of  political  and  religious  interpretation  designed  to  keep 
struggling elites in power, exaggerated by colonial influence, interpreted as truth by influential 
scholars, and appropriated by modern authoritarians, communities in the Middle East and North 
Africa may willingly turn to tyrannical rule.  To combat this eventuality, human rights advocates 
must speak to Islam's cultural heritage.
Consultation, consensus, and interpretation, as defined in Islamic jurisprudence, ensure 
that  the religious community is capable  of participating in its  political  sphere.  To deny this 
inclusion is to deny Mohammed's instruction and practice.  With all of this religious and cultural 
potential, liberal democracies could have replaced the colonial governments.  This did not occur 
for two main reasons.  First, Western influence and aid kept authoritarian regimes in place as 
with the monarchs of Saudi Arabia or the Shah in Iran (Kepel 2002).  Second, opportunistic 
political leaders used the influence of newly emerging radical Islam to legitimize their rule and 
construct  a  dichotomy  with  the  West.   Internalizing  the  old  orientalist  rhetoric,  monarchs, 
dictators, and religious authorities have perpetuated the idea that Western government works in a 
way incompatible with the Middle East and North Africa.  In global discourse, politicians present 
the region as exceptional (Halliday 1996).  Human rights advocates play into this false notion 
when they claim that rights discourse should supersede Islam.  Presenting such claims as attacks, 
the religious and political  elite uses them to further solidify their rule as sentries against the 
imperial  West  (Sahliyeh  2003).   The  cultural  politics  surrounding  democracy  have  been 
counterproductive on the other end as well.
Especially in American international  politics,  democracy is presented as a panacea to 
social, economic, and political troubles.  Empowered by its own internal success, US policy in 
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the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  has  pushed  for  immediate  political  restructure  in  key 
geopolitical  areas.   Echoing the domino theory of the Cold War,  the West has attempted to 
empower  friendly  regimes  and  support  democratic  movements  to  serve  as  buffers  against 
political  enemies (Gerges 1999, Dorraj 1999).  Double standards on human rights (Chomsky 
1998), use of geopolitical buffers, and tacit support of unpopular regimes have further distorted 
the popular conception of democracy in the region.  Noting the West's clear willingness to attack, 
as shown by the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan not to mention the war on terror, Islamists 
can rally popular support by presenting Western action as a full scale war on the Muslim way of 
life.   Of  course,  philosophical  anger  can  only  last  so  long  in  the  face  of  poverty  and 
disenfranchisement.  Perhaps for this reason, most influential anti-West action has often come 
from wealthy, educated men.  Osama Bin Laden and the Saudis who orchestrated the September 
eleventh flights had assets in the billions.   Frustrated by their religion's and nation's position 
within the postcolonial world, they had tried, and failed, to assert themselves on a global stage 
through  Islamism.   But  their  movement,  which  had  lost  much  of  its  support  by  the  new 
millennium,  was  revitalized  by  the  2001  terrorist  attacks  and  the  Western  reaction.   The 
subsequent  violence  and  ethnocentrist  discourse  directed  socioeconomic  anger  away  from 
corrupt leaders and back against the West (Kepel 2002).  Democracy is guilty by association.
To advocate for democracy under the capabilities approach, I should be clear on what 
democracy means.  It does not refer to any specific political structure, real or imagined.  Rather, 
democracy  as  a  capability  refers  to  one’s  ability  to  control  their  environment  and  employ 
practical reason in the management of their life.  This does not need to be accomplished through 
voting booths as in the West or even black and white stones as in ancient Greece.  There is no 
single way to ensure that individuals maintain a stake in their political lives, nor should there be 
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when we remember  that  the  capabilities  approach  advocates  culturally  specific  outcomes  to 
human  rights  problems.   The  idea  of  democratic  government  has  been  utterly  appropriated 
through cultural politics, to the point where its fiercest critics and proponents are more concerned 
with  its  appearance  than  its  function.   However,  as  human  rights  activists  working  in  a 
capabilities framework, anthropologists can focus on function, seeking to preserve and bolster 
culturally meaningful methods of political  participation.   For the purposes of this discussion, 
citizens are defined as community members because the idea of democracy is one that transcends 
the Western idea of the state.  By expanding the definition of citizens in this way, we see that 
political participation is needed for an equitable relationship among members of villages, among 
large families, and in other groups not typically associated with formal governments.  For the 
sake of simplicity I will  use the word state but in the Middle East  and North Africa,  where 
official states sometimes exercise power in name only, I use state to refer to governing bodies in 
whatever form is contextually relevant.
In accordance with Nussbaum’s theory, democracy is a tool that communities can use to 
ensure their engagement with the state, the fulfillment of their social contract, their protection 
under  societal  rules,  freedom  of  belief,  their  equality  with  other  citizens,  and  the  constant 
protection of their personal autonomy.  When the state denies citizens the opportunity to voice 
their  concerns  and  change  political  rules,  it  ignores  their  personal  choices  and  decisions. 
Allowing all citizens to influence policies, either directly or through elected officials, ensures 
that a diversity of viewpoints will be represented in policy decisions.  Because a simple majority 
rule can lead to institutionalized inequality, democracies that embody human rights philosophy 
will also seek out certain protections for citizens holding minority views.
Although  the  capabilities  approach  is  primarily  concerned  with  maintaining  personal 
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choice, it also seeks to ensure that citizens are treated fairly.  In a state ruled by an elite, society 
becomes classed, with first-class citizens enjoying state support and all others clambering for it. 
By  giving  all  people  an  equal  voice  in  policy  decisions  and  implementing  their  wishes, 
democracy presents a way to prevent the domination of a single view, even when it may be the 
majority view.  Where women participate in their government, they are more in control of their 
life decisions.  Where religious minorities can voice their concerns and change laws, the state 
cannot treat them with unequal respect.  
As a political  philosopher, Nussbaum devotes a great deal of time to the complicated 
interactions  between  religion,  equality,  dignity,  access,  and  the  state.   Her  2008  Liberty  of  
Conscience explores  the  development  of  religious  pluralism in  the  United  States.   Drawing 
heavily on the works of Roger Williams, religious philosopher and founder of Rhode Island, she 
traces the development of a social  contract  between the government  and society that  forbids 
religious persecution and refuses to show preferential treatment to a dominant religion.  In some 
cases,  this  dedication  to  religious  equality  of  minority  viewpoints  necessitates  certain 
accommodations, such as allowing observant Jewish people to refuse to testify on Saturdays or 
excluding  priests  from testifying  against  their  congregants.   States  that  draw on a  particular 
religion to inform their civil  laws entangle themselves in a power structure that is inherently 
unjustly biased toward that religion.   As this  idea evolved in American discourse, it  became 
institutionalized in the written constitution, a crucial step for reifying freedoms guaranteed by 
political  rhetoric.   Through  clauses  demanding  free  exercise  and  equitable  treatment,  the 
government is restricted from exacting preferential  treatment  toward members of a dominant 
group.  The remainder of her argument discusses the various ways in which minorities can be 
accommodated so that their capabilities are protected but do not infringe on the liberties of other 
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citizens.   In  the  American  legal  tradition,  the  courts  have  maintained  that  religious 
accommodations must stem from either a “significant burden” on the people or question.  In 
cases  where  accommodation  can  be  overturned,  this  must  result  from  a  “compelling  state 
interest”.  Tracing issues of new religions, religious education, and religious concerns with state 
functions, Nussbaum charts the history of accommodations through the American court system. 
Although  its  success  in  this  system  remains  mixed,  her  argument  makes  it  clear  that 
accommodations are a necessary element in liberal democracies.
Democracy as a Capability
In order for democracies to respect the diversity of human dignity and need embodied in 
the capabilities approach, certain arrangements must be made to protect minorities.  The majority 
creates law in democracies, so special accommodations need to be made for those people whose 
religious or personal convictions prevent them from serving the state in some way.  Quakers who 
conscientiously object to military service, a crucial state function, should not be forced to serve 
because it violates their right to free religious expression.  In the United States, this particular 
issue was resolved satisfactorily according to the capabilities framework by Quakers who agreed 
to work in hospitals or in positions where they were not forced to harm other people.
In  cases  where  opponents  argue  that  accommodations  seem  outlandish  or  seem  to 
threaten the state, anthropologists can use the capabilities approach as a means to filter these 
arguments.  Requests for a religious exemption from work should be respected as they are crucial 
to  religious  functioning.   Similarly,  a  democracy that  contains  religiously observant  Muslim 
women should allow those women to veil  if  they so choose (as discussed earlier  at  length). 
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Democratic, pluralist states must also respect the views of atheists, polytheists, animists, and all 
others who want to avoid compulsory religious services or religious education at state schools 
that  do not conform with their  view of the divine.   Even the most  conservative perspective, 
which  views  exposure  to  other  religions  or  philosophies  as  a  contamination  and  is  thus 
ideologically opposed to cross-cultural dialog, cannot claim that such states impose a substantial 
burden on their citizens because no one is being coerced into believing or practicing religious 
ideas.  Nussbaum cites the case of The Holiness Church of God in Jesus’ Name, which directs its 
members  to handle poisonous snakes and drink strychnine,  as one example  of a sufficiently 
dangerous practice that limits capabilities.
Capabilities require that religious diversity be respected as part of a democratic system. 
Because theocracies establish a single religion as the truth,  they necessarily give preferential 
treatment  to  a  single  faith.   The  minority  religions  within  such a  state  face  an institutional 
disadvantage if not outright persecution.  By elevating one group over another, the state creates 
classed  groups  of  citizens;  those  holding  minority  views  suffer  the  loss  of  their  equality  as 
human beings.  This is not to say that religion cannot or even should not inform civil laws.  The 
ethical codes found in the world’s religions have evolved to serve their communities and should 
not be lightly cast aside.  To do so would disrespect the religiously guided individuals in society. 
Rather, anthropologists should “respect the space required by any activity that has the general 
shape of searching for the ultimate meaning of life, except when that search violates the rights of 
others or comes up against some compelling state interest” (Nussbaum 2008:169).  Democracy 
respects that  the state interest,  in turn, does not limit  human capability.   In fact,  considering 
religiously based morality in secular government is a good form of cross-cultural dialog, which 
can result in equality and cultural specificity.
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Accommodation is an integral  part  of democracy and is the logical  conclusion of the 
ideas of equality and tolerance.  It is the practical means by which the tyranny of the majority 
can be avoided without compromising core values and cultural distinctiveness.  Accommodation 
is designed to protect not only those people who exist in contemporary society, such as religious 
minorities, but also those people who may come to the society in the future.  This system ensures 
the longevity of a just state, open to the natural flow of immigrants and its own self-improvement 
through the new perspectives that their cultural background brings.  
The idea of democracy as a fundamental capability relies on the philosophical push for 
equality for all  citizens.   In the political  realm, this equality depends on equal access to the 
structures that determine one’s life and input into the rules that govern it.  In certain cases, when 
rules asymmetrically benefit society, the majority must accommodate citizens with special needs 
to ensure that all are treated equally.
To give  democracy  a  sense  of  legitimacy and purpose  in  this  context,  human  rights 
advocates can once again use cross cultural dialog and the capabilities approach to break down 
the false incompatibility between democracy and Islam found in cultural politics.  By engaging 
political  leaders  and liberal  democratic  groups,  human rights groups in the Middle East  and 
North Africa as well as the West can work to present Islam within its proper context.  Islam, like 
Christianity  and  Judaism,  can  be  interpreted  to  show an  incompatibility  with  democratic  or 
pluralist  rule.   However,  Judaism  and  Christianity  have  survived  a  number  of  liberal 
reinterpretations, emphasizing peace and deemphasizing monarchal rule, that allow them both to 
function in a pluralist global setting.  I disagree that this difference stems from the comparative 
ages of the religions (Sahliyeh 2003), as it suggests that Islam, chronologically the youngest of 
the three Abrahamic religions, is less mature or developed than the others.  This is not only 
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ethnocentric  and  patronizing  but  it  offers  a  simplistic  and  ignorant  view of  global  politics. 
Islamism, as I have argued previously, stems from centuries of power struggles, interpretation, 
and colonial resentment.  But in order to survive in the continuously globalizing world, Muslims 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa must reject the cultural politics spouted by their 
authoritarian leaders as soundly as they must reject the economic liberalization that has turned 
their nations into rentier states (Monshipouri 1998).  The first steps in cross cultural dialog can 
reaffirm the  Islamic  basis  for  pluralistic  democracy  as  commanded  by  the  shura,  ijma,  and 
ijihad.
Within  the  framework  of  a  nation-state,  democracy,  theoretically,  allows  every 
community  equal  access  to  political  representation.   In  doing  so,  it  allows  individuals  and 
communities to both fulfill their political capabilities.  By having a voice in the government's 
direction, formerly disempowered groups will gain a peaceful means of addressing grievances. 
Authoritarian  states  in  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  that  deny  their  populations  such 
representation do so not on religious or cultural grounds, but because they wish to prevent certain 
parts  of their  polity  safely away from any access  to  power.   That  is,  such states  deny their 
citizens' political capabilities in order to eliminate potential threats to their position.
The fiery rhetoric of the religious and political elite does not necessarily reflect general 
sentiment in the Middle East and North Africa.  The communities of this region are no more 
monolithic  than communities  in  the  West.   Cross  cultural  dialog  pioneered  by scholars  like 
Abdullah  An-Na'im (1996,  2008),  Benazir  Bhutto  (2008)  and Sa'id  al-'Ashmawy (1999)  has 
shown both that democracy is an internal, not imposed, concept and that liberal and interpretive 
approaches  to  law  have  a  long  historical  tradition.   Human  rights  advocates  can  work  for 
democracy  from  within  the  cultural  context,  giving  the  democratization  movement  greater 
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legitimacy.   However,  Ahmad  Moussalli  warns  against  blindly  accepting  the  imposed, 
postcolonial version of democracy imposed by the West to promote stability arguing that it will 
cause  Muslims  to  “suffer  doubly:   first  by the  negative  aspects  of  their  history,  intellectual 
backwardness and traditionalism, and second, by the emergence of new and “modern” tyrannical 
states and comprehensive conflicts as well as the states' control of individual and social life” 
(Moussalli  2001:78).  The ethnocentric trap occurs when human rights advocates, internal or 
external, try to import a supposedly superior system without adapting it to a state's specific social 
and cultural specifications.  The push for popular rule in the Middle East and North Africa can 
and should draw on outside ideas, including Western democracy, but its success hinges on its 
cultural legitimacy.  By disproving the notion of incompatibility forwarded in cultural politics, 
human rights advocates can both depose their authoritarian leaders and provide legitimacy for 
Islamic democracy.
Conclusion
In researching this paper, I have found a few common threads in popular human rights 
discourse.  First  there is the idea of superiority,  that  Western Enlightenment philosophy is a 
universally applicable idea.  By extension, any actions or discourse that appear to conflict with 
Western Enlightenment must be wrong or are at least misguided.  More subtly, this approach 
tends to frame non-Western ideas as pre-Western, as ideas that could be 'enlightened' with a bit 
more development.
Such people malign female genital cutting as barbaric, uncivilized, or disgusting.  Their 
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simplistic  approach  offers  no  respect  for  the  long  history,  cultural  significance,  and 
socioeconomic role that this procedure plays in the community.  “Education” efforts that make 
no effort to involve local opinion and interest imply a similar superiority.  This disregard for the 
validity of the process is completely contrary to the ultimate goal of the capabilities approach. 
This same unproductive attitude is evident in Western feminists who see religious veiling as an 
attempt to hide women away.  This accusation contains the implicit assumptions that veiling is a 
sinister patriarchal structure, that women who veil are ignorant to its true purpose, and that the 
Western view of modesty, dress, and identity are a model that can and should be copied by all 
others.  The patronizing charge that all women who veil are somehow victims of the men in their 
lives damages the efforts of progressive Muslim women everywhere.   This argument is most 
pervasive in the context of democracy.  Fed by popular interest in regional politics in the last ten 
years  and  by  authors  like  Samuel  Huntington,  media  pundits  and  analysts  alike  push  for  a 
democratic system similar to that found in Europe or the USA.  Others, citing Islam’s age at 
1431, compare modern-day political affairs in the region to medieval Christian Europe.  The idea 
that Islamic society will one day civilize and evolve into something similar to modern Western 
society is not merely bigoted.  It assumes that the European model of political participation is 
well-designed and effective in satisfying capabilities and denies alternative systems such as those 
formulating  within  the  regional  or  generally  Islamic  contexts.   In  a  way,  this  recalls  early 
evolutionary  anthropologists  who believed  that  ‘savage’  people  would  someday civilize.   In 
effect,  it  closes the door on reform and a process of constant improvement by activists  from 
within this cultural setting.  It implies that the West can learn nothing from cross-cultural dialog. 
More damning, this argument effectively excuses those leaders who deny political capabilities to 
their citizens by calling them products of their primitive time.  
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Second,  I  have  observed  the  idea  of  insularity,  that  no  society  should  interfere  with 
another.  Unfortunately, this extreme relativism allows rich, powerful geopolitical players to rest 
on their privilege and justify their inaction.  Insularity also conflates the complex interaction of 
political,  social,  cultural,  religious,  and  economic  factors  that  drive  a  community's  cultural 
politics.   Assuming  that  any  cross  cultural  observation  is  impossible  because  of  cultural 
differences presupposes that culture has been unaffected by centuries of conflict and contact and 
thus falls short of a reasonable analysis.
This trend is evident in the long histories invoked to justify authoritarianism, segregative 
veiling,  and genital  cutting.   Those who perpetuate  such human rights abuses cite their  own 
exceptionalism, contending that outsiders cannot understand their customs or that lives are some 
detached from modernity.   In the postcolonial age, where globalized trade has reached every 
corner  of  the  earth  and  humans  have  even  begun  changing  planet’s  climate,  no  group  can 
honestly claim that their culture exists in a vacuum.  Only those traits that conveniently serve the 
existent power structure are justified in this way.  Certainly,  none of these leaders intends to 
forsake their material wealth, international recognition, or weapons in the name of preserving 
traditional values.  The only traditional values they maintain are those of patriarchy, control, and 
greed.  Insularity appears in FGC when relativists advocate for a ‘hands-off’ approach, turning a 
blind eye to the unnecessary pain it  causes.  It  implies  that  all cultural  practices are equally 
significant and beneficial to society at large and should be maintained in their current form at all 
costs.  In fact no cultural practice, FGC included, has maintained its complete connection to the 
past.  As part of the constantly evolving larger cultural context in which it resides, its symbolic 
meaning has changed.  Using the capabilities approach as a guide, a concerned observer will see 
that communities who use the veil to keep their women from participating fully in their own lives 
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are committing a human rights abuse.  When those communities claim exceptionalism to prevent 
outside interference, they betray their dependence on patriarchal control.  When critics claim that 
their disenfranchisement is simply difference, they malign the efforts of progressive activists, 
regional feminists, and those who veil to show their faith and social identity.  Insularity is so 
encompassing  that  it  eliminates  the  ability  to  recognize  degrees  of  severity  and  to  act 
accordingly, on a case by case basis.  In this way, insularity limits capabilities.  Insular thinkers 
ignore the historical inaccuracy and corruption of authoritarian leaders, placing them in a non-
existent cultural setting that excuses their actions.  If this ideology is not out-right patronizing, it 
is  certainly  ignorant.   In  such  situations,  it  falls  to  ethical  and  concerned  observers  to  act, 
advocate, and help the disenfranchised.  The ways to identify abuses of power and methods for 
interfering have already been discussed at length.  The extreme cultural relativist, aware of the 
issues but unwilling to intervene, is as accountable for suffering and indignity as those who cause 
it directly:  inaction is action.  In a way, insularity perpetuates segregation, genital cutting, and 
authoritarian  states  by  considering  their  actions  to  be  completely  exempt  from any  outside 
scrutiny and discouraging the efforts of those who disagree.  It is too late to be insular – cultural 
contact has, is, and will continue.  To be insular in the face of human rights abuses is to limit 
capability.  
I call the third trend reactionism, the tendency to disregard action and discourse because 
of its origin.  Islamism survives on reactionism, responding to the economic and geopolitical 
domination of the West.  In turn, the recent push for democracy and Western Enlightenment 
philosophy in the Middle East and North Africa is due mainly to the impact of terrorism and a 
vague fear that the region's culture and religion are determined to destroy the West.  In the realm 
of  cultural  politics,  reactionism  homogenizes  one's  own  people  along  with  their  political 
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enemies,  transforming both into monolithic blocs.  It  constructs dichotomies and in doing so 
stereotypes and encourages misunderstanding.
The political aspects of FGC and veiling both stem from a reactionary response to the 
conquest and colonization of the Middle East and North Africa.  In response to missionaries and 
official  policies  that  banned  or  restricted  cultural  practices,  and  capabilities,  both  of  these 
became synonymous  with community pride.   Such an identity  relies  not  on a  connection  to 
history, culture, and religion, but rather on the rejection of that which is different.  Remembering 
the  lies  of  colonial  governors,  communities  view  FGC  advocates  with,  at  best,  cautious 
suspicion.  Believing that the West brings moral degradation and living in a region prone to 
warfare  and interference  by foreign powers,  communities  shy away from Western lifestyles. 
Associating unveiled women with corruption and decadence, communities enforce the veil and 
FGC.  As the same foreigners that they want to avoid try to interfere further, they turn to a more 
conservative approach that stands farther from Western norms.  Misinterpreting this response in 
the West, feminists and liberals lament the sorry state of women’s health and well-being in the 
Middle East and North Africa.  But their information is incomplete, provided by a news agency 
with little interest in history or culture, and viewed in light of a political situation that considers 
foreigners from the region potential  terrorists.   The natural  assumption for those with strong 
ideals but short attention spans is to lump the complex and distinct communities from Iran to 
Morocco in one large, hostile group.  For a population frightened of terrorists, homogeneity is 
much easier to dislike and rally against.  In this group consciousness, the other crystallizes and 
takes the shape of all that is different, wrong, and barbaric.  This extends to the renewed faith in 
secular democracy, a symbol of enlightened Western society.  While certain Western politicians 
and media pundits view it as a cure for political upheaval or even the final stage of political 
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evolution for an advanced civilization, their opponents in the Middle East and North Africa see 
imperialism, disrespect, and the decline of their global independence.  Many of those opponents 
also view democracy as the end of the regional power, so they opt to prevent it.  Using their own 
media and conservative interpretations of history or religion, they encourage citizens to reject 
democracy and forfeit their own political participation.  Cultural politics encourages the polities 
of both groups to focus on keeping the ideological enemy at bay,  thus distracting them from 
human rights abuses, capability limitations, and their own disenfranchisement.  
These observations have led me to favor a fourth, newly emerged paradigm.  Alternately 
referred  to  as  cross  cultural  dialog  or  diatopical  hermeneutics,  this  approach  necessitates  a 
holistic  stance  on  human  rights.   A  philosophical  form  of  pluralism,  this  is  an  open 
communication  that  acknowledges  that  no  system  is  perfect  and  that  one’s  society,  values, 
government,  and human rights position can be improved by re-examination and conversation 
with those who have differing opinions.   Extreme universal  and relativist  arguments  can be 
useful  because  they force  human  rights  advocates  to  constantly  guard against  superiority  or 
insularity.   However,  in  a  world  constantly  shrinking  under  the  pressure  of  transnational 
corporations, immigration, war, and economic liberalization, human rights must adopt a more 
pragmatic stand.  The best way to accomplish this dialog is through a careful and culturally 
informed examination of personal capabilities.  This versatile approach allows anthropologists to 
understand human rights in terms of that which people are able to do and be.  By looking at 
capabilities,  human  rights  advocates  can  largely  ignore  the  unproductive  rhetoric  that 
characterizes cultural politics and work from within a culturally specific and informed base.
Among political imprisonment, torture, human trafficking, and thousands of more severe 
and arguably more important human rights abuses, why focus on female genital cutting, veiling, 
86
and democracy?  First these three ideas are more culturally tied to the communities that practice 
them than many others.  They have distinct histories and are born out of a context older than 
Mohammed, heavily influenced by Islam, twisted by colonialism, reinterpreted as new leaders 
filled the postcolonial vacuum, and now navigate cultural politics in a post 9/11 world.  For this 
reason, these ideas are more susceptible to international critique than more obvious human rights 
infractions.  There are far fewer doubts about the legitimacy of massacres than of the burqa. 
And, of course, as an anthropologist, I am more interested in cultural and communal rights than 
in those covered by international laws and treaties.
In this  paper,  I  make a concerted effort  to explore the cultural  history that  surrounds 
human rights, especially the specific cases of female genital cutting, veiling, and democracy.  I 
believe that many of the incompatibility theories relate to a flawed understanding of history and 
its reinterpretation by political elites, colonial powers, and opportunistic religious leaders.  I have 
discussed the regional histories at length, but it is important to note that “Western” and “non-
Western” are such broad categories that they are only useful because they are the terms used in 
cultural politics.  Nussbaum attributes such errors to a short memory:
We forget that  modern mathematics,  which played a key role in the European 
Enlightenment, had its origins in Arab culture; we forget that Christianity had its 
origins in a part of the world that nowadays is regarded as “non-Western”.  We 
forget that the roots of ideas of human equality,  democracy,  and human rights 
existed in many different cultures and that their full development in “our own” is 
a very recent matter.  We forget that ideas of religious toleration and equal respect 
were well known in India by the time of Ashoka’s empire, in the third century 
B.C.E., a very long time before they were known in Europe (Nussbaum, 2007:7).
When discussing human rights, advocates must avoid the familiar trap of cultural politics 
and  recognize  that  their  culture  is  dynamic  and  has  been  influenced  by  a  vast  history  of 
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interaction,  dialog,  and  interpretation.   In  the  increasingly  pluralist  world,  anthropological 
methods are crucial to developing ideas of legitimacy and legitimizing seemingly foreign ideas.
I  specifically  focused  on  three  ideas  that  have  no  easy  answers,  occupy  a  nebulous 
position in international law, and have been distorted in cultural politics.  Anthropologists and 
social  theorists  have  written  the  majority  of  the  literature  on  these  subjects  and  the  most 
important texts in the field are contentious and authors seldom agree with one another.  In short, 
it is the perfect environment for the capabilities approach.  This system alone is equipped to fully 
understand every viewpoint, investigate history and verify authenticity, promote legitimacy by 
finding solutions that do not compromise underlying values, and above all ensure that human 
capabilities  are  being protected.   Female  genital  cutting,  veiling,  and democracy are  shining 
examples of both the inadequacy of current rights systems and the value of capabilities.
In any such situation where normative values break down and the way forward is unclear, 
capabilities  can  illuminate  the  way  forward  better  than  rights,  duties,  or  laws.   More 
optimistically, we can understand triumphs (or perceived triumphs) in human rights through the 
capabilities approach as well.  Just as with potential abuses, potential successes in human rights 
discourse can be problematized by cultural politics.
The  capabilities  approach  can  be  easily  applied  to  other  current  issues  studied  by 
anthropologists,  including elections in Iraq, the Millennium Development Goals, the growing 
concern over food access in American inner cities, and gay marriage reform in the United States. 
Elections  are  a  tool  by which democracy can occur,  but  it  is  not  the only form of  political 
participation.  More important is the functioning that this tool allows.  Because of the sectarian 
nature of Iraqi religious politics, Shari’a may be less helpful than this western form of political 
input.  The famous photographs of stained thumbs from women and men throughout the country 
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are a  testament  to  the fulfillment  of that  central  capability.   However,  the ongoing political 
destabilization that followed Iraq’s historic election has limited the functional abilities of those 
voters, and so elections can no longer be said to satisfy the right to shape one’s own life.
The Millennium Development Goals center on a rights-based approach and are thus more 
rigid and culturally based than the capabilities approach.  Rather than seeking to improve what 
people are actually able to do and be, they aim to improve the system on a state level.  Their 
rhetoric has the potential to benefit the areas that the UN considers to be underdeveloped, but the 
tools that they use, namely neoliberal economic development, are functionally ineffective in the 
lives of the people the goals hope to improve.  This is especially clear in Latin America, where 
neoliberal  policies  designed  to  stabilize  currency  and  improve  global  confidence  in  those 
economies has,  at best, done nothing to improve the lives of millions in poverty and, at worst, 
has led to the erosion of the social safety nets that mitigated this poverty in the past.  By failing 
to  improve  lives within their  own cultural  and historical  context,  this  program perpetuates  a 
distrust of Western/Northern policy and satisfies little more than the greed of a corporate class 
who benefits from the new market.
The issue of food deserts, areas in which good food is either too expensive or too difficult 
for  inner-city  residents  to  seek out,  relates  to  access,  health,  and equity  (Winne 2008).   As 
grocery stores followed ‘white flight’ out of cities, they left small shops with few competitors but 
because of their location, no room to expand to the retail size of their suburban counterparts.  As 
a result of low competition, higher food prices, and the inefficiency of shipping fresh food into 
the  city,  prices  increased  but  quality  diminished.   Inner  city  supermarkets  have  become 
inadequate for meeting the needs of low-income families.  Small and poorly stocked, they offer 
few fresh vegetables and even fewer nutritional options.  Cheap or fast food options abound, in 
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part  because of the low cost and convenience.   Because large supermarkets  can make more 
money  in  the  suburbs  than  cities,  most  city  groceries  remain  relatively  small  but  the  food 
production system favors economies  of scale.   As city groceries  closed or raised prices,  the 
resulting gap created so-called food deserts.  The physical difficulty of shopping where the food 
is fresh and inexpensive perpetuates food insecurity.  From a capabilities perspective, people in 
this  situation  lack  the  access  to  the  same  health  and  quality  of  life  that  their  suburban 
counterparts enjoy with respect to a fundamental need.  Business interests and poor city planning 
have denied them this opportunity and their physical health is suffering as a result.  As a result of 
this, their ability to take control of their lives and reach a full potential is seriously impacted.
Gay marriage is extremely relevant to capabilities and the discussion of accommodation 
because  of  the  vocal  religious  objections  by  conservative  Americans.   However,  allowing 
homosexuals  to  marry  does  not  force  objectors  to  marry  other  members  of  the  same  sex. 
Denying homosexuals that right does, in fact, force them to adopt a heterosexual perspective. 
The issue is one of equal treatment for all citizens.  A gay marriage ban denies the same rights 
afforded  by  the  state  to  heterosexual  couples  to  homosexual  couples,  giving  preferential 
treatment to a majority group.  Not only would such legislation limit homosexuals’ capability to 
pursue love and commitment  in their  cultural  context,  it  establishes the idea that  one sexual 
preference  is  correct  and  the  other  is  wrong.   In  that  world,  homosexuals  are  second-class 
citizens.  If American critics remember laws against interracial marriage or early colonial laws 
that forbade Jewish weddings (Nussbaum 2008), they will understand the ongoing struggle for 
marital freedom. 
In the age of globalization, anthropology is more relevant than it has ever been.  The 
capabilities approach is a universal framework for human rights, but it is utterly dependent on 
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anthropological data.  Because we rely so heavily on ethnography, anthropologists are uniquely 
qualified to synthesize raw cultural data with broader social, political,  and economic theories. 
This  leads  to  a  fuller  understanding of  a  holistic  worldview and provides  the understanding 
necessary for a culturally specific adaption of Nussbaum’s capabilities.  Previous human rights 
schemes have relied either on laws based entirely in Western practice with little regard for local 
tradition and blatant disregard for religious differences, or have degraded into ineffective and 
ultimately  self-defeating  extreme  cultural  relativism.   The  capabilities  approach  demands 
anthropological  data  and  requires  the  skills  necessary  to  equitably  mediate  culturally  based 
interpretations of human fundamentals.  Perhaps more importantly, this anthropologically based 
method allows groups to speak for themselves, prove the legitimacy of their customs, show their 
commitment  to a greater quality of life,  and improve the global community by sharing their 
unique perspective.  At a time when great numbers of people are rallying against human rights 
abuses, anthropologists have been given an opportunity to use their skillset to facilitate equity 
and dialogue throughout the world.
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be extremely useful in dealing 
with matters  of torture  or wrongful imprisonment,  it  is inadequate  for more culturally based 
rights and ideas.  The capabilities approach provides a philosophical base from which to address 
perceived abuses, but in the absence of cross cultural dialog Western human rights advocates run 
the risk of misunderstanding culture as abuse.  The complex historical background of the Middle 
East  and  North  Africa  has  led  to  a  conflation  between  religion,  culture,  and  politics  in  the 
rhetorical  battles between political  elites in the East and West.  To accept polarized political 
discourse as the truth would ignore this convoluted past.  The power of the capabilities approach 
lies in its willingness to consider the different possible angles that have led to a cultural practice. 
91
Rather than seeking to provide immediate change, dialog forces different parties to gradually 
work out their problems and urges that they fully understand a situation before attempting to 
change it.  Because the process is dialog and not instruction, it will force both the West and the 
Middle East and North Africa to consider their shortcomings.  In time, both can learn from each 
other and realize that while economics and politics may divide, culture can unite.
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